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Abstract 
We provide the most comprehensive description of student segregation in the Portuguese public school system to date, a system that 
exhibits interesting institutional features potentially linked with the student segregation issue (e.g. school catchment areas, course 
tracking, and almost no central regulations regarding class composition). The analysis uses the entire regular student population enrolled 
in all public schools of continental Portugal (grades 1 to 12, from 2006/07 to 2016/17). Looking at three segregation dimensions – 
economic, academic, and immigrant – at both between and within-school levels, and using a novel dissimilarity index recently proposed 
in the literature aimed at better capturing systematic segregation, we find that segregation, on median, is mild, across time, grades, and 
regions. The most important exception is the case of within-school academic segregation. During upper-secondary schooling, in 
particular, when students are divided across classes according to own course-tracking decisions, it doubles. Moreover, within-school 
academic segregation estimates have the largest interquartile ranges, within a given year, grade, or region, pointing to heterogeneity in 
the way different schools set up classes internally in terms of students’ academic characteristics. Academic and economic segregation 
are positively associated, at both between and within school levels. The Portuguese segregation insights are also compared to those 
from other geographies. 
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1 Introduction 
Contemporaneous societies value knowing how students seat across schools and, within schools, across classes. 
The accumulated evidence on cognitive and non-cognitive peer effects strongly supports this view (Sacerdote, 2011). 
Year after year students and parents decide, to some extent, on which school to attend and on which class to bargain 
for, partly based on those effects (known or perceived). Teachers are also likely pursuing a seat on specific schools 
and classes partly conditional on actual or expected student composition (Horng, 2009). On the other hand, 
knowledge on the distribution of students across and within schools is important to understand what kind of student 
sorting policies are being implemented by schools and by the relevant local or central governments (West & 
Wöβmann, 2006; Bloom, Lemos, Sadun &Van Reenen, 2015). Such policies must be checked to determine if they 
conform with societal values related to equity and social inclusion or not, or whether students’ quality of education, 
in particular, and quality of life, in general, might be at risk or not under them. It is then key to supply coherent and 
extensive measures of student segregation, that is, of how they are unevenly sorted, both across and within schools, 
so that all major actors of the education system can act upon, and the society in general judge upon, on the actual, 
real, distribution of students. 
Portugal, the country here analyzed, is not an exception to these considerations. The objective of this article is 
to precisely describe the state of student segregation in Portugal. In doing so, the following research questions will 
be our focus. Does between and within-school segregation vary over time, grades, and districts? Do between and 
within-school segregation levels differ from one another? What is the relationship between minority shares and 
segregation levels, and between different dimensions of segregation? We believe this study provides the answers to 
these research questions and is able to match them with institutional features of the Portuguese school system. 
The empirical analysis uses the dataset compiled by the Sistema de Informação do Ministério da Educação1 
(MISI). This student-level administrative database follows all students, from all twelve grades, enrolled in public 
(state-owned, state-managed) schools in continental Portugal, throughout an entire decade (2006/07 – 2016/17). 
Given information on the actual classes and schools students were placed in, and on the schools’ location (namely 
the municipality where they are located), we are able to analyze student segregation at two distinct levels: between-
schools (within-municipality), and within-schools (across classes of the same grade). For each of these levels we 
look at three segregation dimensions, each stemming from specific students’ dichotomous characteristics: economic 
(low-income vs non-low-income), academic (at least one retention vs no retentions), and immigrant (born abroad or 
with at least one parent born abroad vs all three not born abroad). Segregation is measured with the density-corrected 
dissimilarity index (Ddc) recently proposed by Allen, Burgess, Davidson, & Windmeijer (2015) to capture systematic 
segregation more robustly than the classic dissimilarity index (D). 
Our main findings are that (1) there is a substantial increase in within-school academic segregation (and just a 
modest one for within-school economic segregation), during upper-secondary as compared to previous grades; (2) 
between-school segregation varies somewhat across primary, upper-primary, lower-secondary, and upper-secondary, 
but much less across grades within each of these stages; (3) over time, all segregation dimensions, at both between 
and within-school levels, exhibit time-invariant mild levels, with the case of within-school academic segregation 
presenting the highest values; (4) regional differences are more marked in terms of between-school segregation rather 
 
1 Information System of the Ministry of Education. 
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than within-school, with the municipalities belonging to the districts of Lisboa and Setúbal (the country’s capital 
area) exhibiting the relative highest (and most precisely estimated) levels of unevenness in the way students are 
placed across schools; and (5) there is a mild positive association between academic and economic segregation, at 
both between and within-school levels (after netting-out several confounding factors). These are important findings 
as they indicate that academic, and to a lesser extent economic, characteristics of the students correlate with their 
observed placement, both between and within schools. Immigrant status of students also correlates with their 
placement, but this dimension does not seem to present higher segregation levels than the other two dimensions 
analyzed.  
We show that certain characteristics of the Portuguese public education system seem to explain (up to a certain 
degree) the patterns found. Namely, (1) the upper-secondary tracking regime for the differing segregation levels 
before and after grade 10; (2) the differing granularities of the networks of primary, upper-primary, and lower and 
upper-secondary schools combined with the existence of school-catchment areas for the differences in between-
school segregation levels across those educational stages (and districts); and (3) the vagueness of central regulations 
regarding class composition for within-school segregation patterns in general.  
Domestic and international researchers and analysts will value this paper for the following three contributions. 
First, it offers a comprehensive and coherent study of the student segregation phenomena across what seem to be the 
main dimensions and levels of analysis usually adopted in the school segregation literature (economic, academic, 
immigrant; between and within schools), for the same country and period. To our knowledge, this is rare in the 
literature with past studies more often providing analyses restricted to fewer combinations of dimensions/levels of 
segregation. Although quite likely due to perfectly legitimate reasons such as researchers’ own research interests or 
limited data availability, the apparent scarcity of studies offering a more overarching type of analysis, such as the 
one we present here forces any interested reader to compare evidence related to different kinds of segregation from 
different sources. Due to differences of regions, periods, and idiosyncratic data treatment procedures likely found 
across them, comparability may be less straightforward, something that we believe to be avoided in this work 
(Conger, 2005, is an interesting example of another comprehensive study of segregation in terms of offering both a 
between and within-school analysis, though merely dedicated to the immigrant/racial dimension, see Table 1).  
Secondly, it uses almost the entire student population of a European country throughout more than a decade, 
which also is uncommon in the literature (Allen & Vignoles, 2007, is a similar example for England, 1989-2004, see 
Table 1). Lastly, the Portuguese public education system likely contains characteristics similar to those located in 
other geographies and economies, meaning that similar segregation patterns might be at work there (e.g. 
Mediterranean Region, and Latin America). The Portuguese case may then be a useful reference point. 
The following Section reviews the literature related with three important topics for this study: (1) the broad 
peer effects, (2) the methodology to measure segregation, and (3) studies on segregation or related subjects devoted 
to the Portuguese case and to that of other geographies to better highlight the contributions of this paper. Section 3 
details the institutional context of the Portuguese education system, namely features related to the allocation process 
whereby students are placed across schools and classes. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses the actual 
methodology employed to measure segregation. The segregation estimates are provided in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
One of the main reasons why student segregation is of concern has to do with the suspicion that similar students 
placed in schools or classes with different types of peers may lead those students to adopt different behaviors that 
otherwise they would not. Different behaviors are likely tied to different outcomes (educational or other) meaning 
that different segregation patterns are potentially linked to unequal educational or life opportunities.  
In this regard, the economics of education peer effects literature has been gradually establishing the causal 
relationship between exposure to certain types of peers and individual students’ outcomes, Sacerdote (2011), though 
some uncertainties remain regarding magnitudes and non-linearities of the effects. Exposure to higher achieving 
peers, in particular, has been argued to be incremental to individual cognitive outcomes, especially for individuals in 
the bottom of the achievement distribution. On this, some interesting studies employing large administrative datasets 
(fixed effects estimations) are Hanushek, Kain, Markman & Rivkin (2003); Sund (2009); Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt 
(2012); Arcidiacono, Foster, Goodpaster & Kinsler (2012); and Burke and Sass (2013). The last two of these also 
present evidence that peer effects are more intense in specific disciplines (requiring more collaborative work) and at 
the class rather than at the school-grade level. Importantly, Burke and Sass (2013) demonstrate that the peers’ ability 
effect on individual performance is sensitive to the initial achievement level of the student in a non-monotone way 
(i.e. it is incremental to be exposed to academically gifted peers, but not with peers who are much more gifted relative 
to own baseline level). Applying instrumental variable strategies, Lefgren (2004) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari, & 
Woolston (2012) provide more evidence on peers’ ability positively impacting individual outcomes, though faintly, 
as well as on classroom ability heterogeneity (no heterogeneity meaning total segregation in academic ability) having 
an inverse U-shaped relationship with individual performance (thus suggesting the existence of an optimal strictly 
positive level of class ability heterogeneity). Contrasting with the De Giorgi et al. (2012) study, Duflo, Dupas, & 
Kremer (2011) offer experimental evidence supporting the view that increasing the percentage of top achieving 
classmates positively influences all students within the school. Meaning that sorting students across homogeneous 
classes (according to previous academic achievement) would be the desirable policy. 
The effects of racial peer composition on student achievement has also been examined, though more often in 
the context of USA schools. For example, Hoxby (2000); Angrist & Lang (2004); and Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin 
(2009) find that peer effects are stronger intra-race and that larger shares of black students negatively affect black 
students, with no significant reciprocal effect on whites. Hoxby (2000) also deals with gender peer effects. 
Looking at the Portuguese case, Firmino, Nunes, Reis, & Seabra (2018), find preliminary evidence that for 
Portuguese students (grades 5 through 9), too, there seem to exist important classroom peer effects, namely a negative 
impact from sharing the classroom with low-income students. In line with this, Seabra, Carvalho, & Ávila (2019) 
also document a negative effect from exposure to larger concentrations of low SES students in Portugal (4th graders), 
at the school-grade level, especially for African descendent students. 
Some studies have examined peer effects beyond those related to pure academic achievement. Verkuyten & 
Thijs (2004) document a negative relationship between the class proportion of non-foreigners and foreigner students’ 
self-esteem, in the Netherlands. In the USA, analyzing the Moving to Opportunity program, which diminished 
economic segregation across neighborhoods by displacing low-income families to less impoverished zones in the 
cities, Ludwig, Duncan, Gennetian, Katz, et al. (2013) make the case that growing up in less impoverished 
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neighborhoods builds up subjective well-being, especially for low-income students, while Chetty, Hendren, & Katz 
(2016) document better long-term outcomes (higher chance for college enrollment, higher labor market earnings, and 
lower single parenthood rates) for sufficiently young moving children. 
From the perspective of what might cause a non-random allocation of students, Bosworth (2014) interestingly 
documents empirical evidence supporting that classroom assignment is driven by students’ observables. Students’ 
characteristics are likely to be taken into account when it comes the time to decide on their distribution across classes, 
within any given school. Agents such as school authorities and parents likely try to optimally place them according 
to their specific preferences and goals, possibly to reap the benefits and avoid the costs from exposure to certain types 
of peers. Still on this topic, Levy & Razin (2017) present a theoretical model showing that due to a learning failure 
while in the labor market, repeating generations of parents may persist with different beliefs regarding which the best 
school might be (the most productivity-enhancing school) to send their children to, thus perpetuating segregation, 
even if there are no real differences between schools in terms of the value added accrued to students (i.e. to their 
offspring, the next generation of parents). 
Turning to the topic of segregation measurement, several metrics have been proposed in the literature in past 
decades, see Frankel & Volij (2011) for a review. One sees at least three main sets of measures: group 
interactions/exposure, diversity, and unevenness (OECD, 2019).2 Measuring group interactions relies on estimating 
the likelihood that one member of one group comes into contact with members of (an)other group(s) (e.g. the 
exposure index, or its normalized version). Measuring diversity seeks to estimate how many different groups are 
represented within a given statistical unit, e.g. a school, see Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) and Frankel & Volij 
(2011) for recent theoretical and empirical applications on this. One possible example within this set of measures is 
the mutual information/entropy index. The third set of measures may be labeled as estimators of departures from 
evenness (with respect to the distribution of members belonging to one of two possible groups across statistical sub-
units forming a wider unit, e.g. across classes within schools, or across schools within a geographical region).  
Duncan & Duncan (1955) showed that many unevenness measures, for example the popular dissimilarity index 
(D) and the Gini coefficient (Gi), form a family of indexes related to the analysis of the segregation curve. Despite 
Massey & Denton (1988) claiming, based on factor and principal component analyses, that the dissimilarity index 
should be adopted as the reference within the set of unevenness measures, it too has been subject to criticism. Cortese, 
Falk, & Cohen (1976) noted that D uses as reference point the evenness scenario (𝐷 = 0), whereas researchers might 
be more interested to compare observed levels of segregation to the case of random allocation of individuals to units. 
Insofar as randomness in allocation generates expected strictly positive levels of unevenness (𝐷 > 0), it might be 
more informative to know by how much the observed distribution of individuals adds, in terms of unevenness, to that 
expectation and not to the eventual randomness-inconsistent case of complete evenness. Based on this insight, 
Carrington & Troske (1997) formulate another segregation index capable of measuring unevenness above (which 
would be seen as segregation) and, theoretically, also below (which would then be seen as inclusion) the expected 
level of unevenness consistent with randomness. On the other hand, the dissimilarity index has the virtue of not 
 
2 Residential segregation literature conveys five types of measures: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and 
clustering (Massey & Denton, 1988). The last three types convey information regarding the spatial nature of segregation, which 
is not focused on this paper, so we take the first two and add diversity as the main contenders for our purposes. 
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depending mechanically on the minority share (at least under not too extremely small values of the minority share). 
This is convenient for comparisons of different statistical units with potentially different minority shares. 
The Gorard index (G) (Gorard & Taylor, 2002) and the current concentration index (CC) (OECD, 2019) are 
other possible measures of segregation that happen to be sensitive to the minority share.3 The Gorard index, in 
particular, has been shown by Allen & Vignoles (2007) to not likely be the best choice (as compared with a 
segregation curve index such as D or Gi) to analyze segregation across schools given the potential large variations in 
minority shares across them (besides presenting other technical drawbacks such as not being 0-1 bounded, nor being 
symmetric). The square-root index is yet another segregation index proposed in Hutchens (2001) and Hutchens 
(2004). Although the square-root index satisfies seven important properties, the dissimilarity index satisfies five of 
these, failing only at two related with the ability to aggregate and with additive decomposability (see note 2 in Allen 
& Vignoles, 2007; we will elucidate these five properties of D in Section 5). 
More recently, Allen et al. (2015) offer several correction procedures to the dissimilarity index in order to make 
it a measure of systematic segregation. The corrections aim to, precisely, partial-out the “bias” of strictly positive 
levels of unevenness that may be coherent with random allocation. These bias-adjustments are more intense whenever 
the fundamental parameters of unevenness segregation – minority share and unit sizes – are very small, which are 
the ones more likely to exacerbate D even under a random underlying allocation process. It is one of the bias-corrected 
dissimilarity indexes supplied in this last reference the one employed in this article to measure segregation, namely 
their density-corrected dissimilarity index (Ddc). 
As far as we are aware, there are no available analyses related to student segregation in Portugal, at least not 
comparable to the scope and magnitude of what we present here. Some studies look at specific types of students that 
are usually of interest to segregation analyses, such as those with immigrant background, e.g. Marques, Rosa, & 
Martins (2007), Hortas (2013), Roldão (2015), or those with specific ethnic background (e.g. Gypsy/Roma students, 
see Abrantes, Seabra, Caeiro, Almeida, & Costa, 2016; and Araújo, 2016). However, these do not delve into formal 
segregation analysis, but rely instead on describing socioeconomic contexts and their relationship to student 
achievement. Moreover, most of these studies employ methodologies such as the case-study or personal interviews 
that, in spite of offering a deep perspective on the few cases analyzed, fail to provide a comprehensive view of the 
phenomena (i.e. they lack external validity).4 Central authorities have, to date and to the extent of our knowledge, 
produced one study on student segregation: Baptista & Pereira (2018). However, this work merely analyzes between-
school economic segregation (within-districts; continental Portugal), only for 5th and 6th grade students (out of twelve 
 
3 OECD (2019) provides the exact mathematical relationship among these indexes and the dissimilarity index: 𝐶𝐶 =  2𝑝𝐺 =
 2𝑝(1 −  𝑝)𝐷, with CC, G, and D, as the indexes, and p as the minority share. 
4 The Abrantes et al. (2016) and Araújo (2016) studies on Gypsy students are quite representative on this with the former focusing 
on one single public primary school in Lisboa, and the latter on another single public primary school in a rural area of Portugal. 
Nevertheless, they document extremely interesting insights. The former reports an outstanding 80% of the school population 
belonging to that single ethnic group, and with Gypsy parents reporting that they tend to be informally barred from enrolling 
their children in neighboring public primary schools. The latter documents a case of (total) white-flight from the school analyzed 
immediately after Gypsy parents started enrolling their children there. These constitute signs of strong ethnic between-school 
segregation (at least across primary schools) that, unfortunately, are impossible to extrapolate much further beyond those 
particular schools. Present Portuguese legislation prevents generalized collection of racial or ethnic information, which, 
understandably, forces researchers to apply case-study type of methodologies. Our dataset is not an exception. We are unable to 
study the between/within-school sorting of any ethnic/racial type of student. Hopefully, future versions of the database will 
provide more information regarding student ethnicity and/or race to allow fully understanding these phenomena and their real 
extent. 
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grades in total) and for the single 2015/16 school-year. Using a segregation measure describing the average difference 
between all possible pairs of schools (within a given district) in terms of proportion of low-income students, they 
find that schools situated in the most urban and populated districts such as Lisboa, Porto, and Setúbal (Map A1, 
Appendix A) exhibit the highest levels of economic segregation. In turn, Justino, Santos, Beatriz, Gramaxo et al. 
(2017) map a series of indicators related to students’ socioeconomic status, achievement levels, and teacher 
characteristics for all municipalities and schools of continental Portugal. Among their conclusions two relate closely 
with the analysis we present here: (1) immigrant students tend to be concentrated in municipalities/schools of the 
Lisboa metropolitan area and of Algarve (southernmost Faro district), and (2) they suggest that there is between-
school economic segregation, especially in the most urban municipalities. Unfortunately, they do not provide formal 
segregation statistics. Finally, the interesting work of Bêa (2018) is, perhaps, the closest exercise that exists to ours. 
Bêa uses the same administrative database across the same school-years as we do, but looks only at between-school 
segregation, just within the municipality of Lisboa, only across primary (1st cycle) schools, and uses the classic D. 
Her main findings are that economic and immigrant between-school segregation levels in Lisboa seem to have been 
relatively high in the last decade. More specifically, Bêa estimates that around 40% of low-income and immigrant 
students would need to change from their current schools to another one in the city so that their distribution across 
Lisboa’s primary schools would be completely even. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the empirical literature on student segregation since the early 2000s and compares 
several aspects with the present study. Despite not being an exhaustive list of all past studies on the topic we believe 
it suggests the Portuguese case we offer here expands the existing evidence in a number of aspects: (1) it is a non-
Anglo-Saxon case encompassing the entire student population (grades 1 through 12) of a Southern European country; 
(2) it provides an overview of student segregation throughout a full recent decade; (3) it supplies a variety of 
combinations of different dimensions (economic, academic, and immigrant) and of distinct levels of analysis 
(between and within-school, the latter being the rarest in the related literature) of student segregation for the same 
education system, as well as a study on the structural correlations between all combinations of dimensions/levels of 
segregation and respective minority shares; and (4) uses the relatively recent density corrected dissimilarity index 
(Allen et al., 2015) as a more robust metric to measure segregation. 
Finally, there are other important topics related to the student segregation topic in general that we should 
mention, though we will not delve into them here. One is that of quantifying the social welfare impact brought about 
by the uneven distribution of students across entities like schools or classes. We point to the Río & Alonso-Villar 
(2018) contribution as a clear methodological advance in this regard. The other is whether observed student 
segregation might be counteracted (or exacerbated) by students themselves. Holfve-Sabel (2015) presents the 
interesting case of Swedish 6th graders who seem to offset, at least partially, within-school immigrant segregation 
through their inclusive decisions about whom to work with during lessons. 
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3 Institutional Context 
The Portuguese education system groups 12 sequential grades in four cycles across five main types of school 
(Table A1, Appendix A).5 Pupils aged 5 (minority) or 6 (majority) years-old begin the 1st cycle at grade 1 and 
complete it at the end of grade 4. Students enrolled in grades 6 and 9 finish the 2nd and 3rd cycles, respectively. Upper-
secondary – containing grades 10 to 12 – constitutes the final cycle of studies before labor market or college.  
The five types of school operating within the public system offer different combinations of cycles. Type-1 
schools provide grades 1 to 4 and these grades can only be offered by such schools. Type-2 schools offer both 2nd 
and 3rd cycles, spanning grades 5 to 9. Type-3 schools have students from cycles 2 to 4 (grades 5 to 12). Type-4 
schools supply cycles 3 and 4, i.e. grades 7 to 12. Finally, type-5 schools offer only grades 10 to 12, i.e. only cycle 
4. 
Schools receive enrollment requests which they must then accept or reject according to criteria defined by the 
central government. When total enrollment requests to a given school are less than that school’s capacity there is no 
need to decide which students are allowed to enroll or not since the school has capacity to accept everyone. However, 
when demand for a school seat exceeds the school’s capacity an ordered list of criteria must then be followed to 
assess which applicants are given a place at the school. A simple summary of that list of criteria is as follows: (1) 
whether the student has a special education need, (2) whether the student was enrolled in that school in the previous 
year, (3) whether the student has a sibling enrolled in that school, (4) whether the student is recipient of 
socioeconomic support, (5) whether the student resides in the school catchment area, (6) whether a parent works in 
the school catchment area. This list of tie-breaks varies somewhat from cycle to cycle, and across school-years, with 
some criteria moving up or down one or two positions. In spite of possible variations of a criterion’s position, it 
shows that residential segregation may translate to between-school segregation given that residency impacts the 
school acceptance scheme both directly through criterion (5), as well as indirectly through criterion (4) as families 
tend to cluster in neighborhoods of relatively homogenous socioeconomic conditions (e.g. Malheiros & Vala, 2004 
report clear spatial residential segregation patterns across parishes and neighborhoods belonging to the metropolitan 
area of Lisboa with respect to persons with a foreign nationality; this, in turn, may correlate with socioeconomic 
status). 
Classes are usually maintained unchanged throughout all grades within a given cycle, by schools, hence school-
induced segregation of students within-schools, across classes, should be more intensely observed at the beginning 
of each cycle (if any occurs). Especially if the beginning of the cycle coincides with moving to a new school. 
Specifically, these cases refer to students enrolling in grade 1 (always into a type-1 school), in grade 5 (always into 
type-2 or type-3 schools), in grade 7 (several possible school-move combinations between school types 2, 3, and 4), 
and in grade 10 (several possible school-move combinations between school types 2, 3, 4, and 5). There are two main 
exceptions: (i) students repeating a given grade who are displaced from their current class and reassigned to one of 
 
5 From 2009/10 on, mandatory schooling was enlarged to encompass upper-secondary. Under this new regime, students are 
legally entitled to leave the education system (if they want so) only as soon as at least one of the following two conditions is 
true: (1) turning 18 years-old, or (2) having finished 12th grade. By contrast, the previous regime was mechanically the same, 
differing only in the thresholds: 15 years-old for condition (1), or completing 9th grade for condition (2). The new thresholds 
regime was enacted upon all students whom, by 2009/10 enrolled in 7th grade. By 2014/15 all students from all 12 grades were 
subject to the new regime. We should mention that although within the Portuguese public schooling system upper-secondary 
schooling is not formally called “4th cycle” (it is best known as secundário), we do so here for expositional simplicity. 
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the newly promoted classes of the grade they have to repeat (mixed-grade classes are only found in type-1 schools 
and for this reason we do not compute within-school segregation measures for grades 1 to 4; we come back to this 
issue when discussing the segregation measure used); and (ii) students moving from one school to another within a 
given cycle, or even within a given grade in the middle of a given academic year. 
Whereas between-school sorting of students is clearly regulated whenever schools receive more enrollment 
requests than capacity, within-school (across classes) sorting of students, during the whole period considered, was 
quite vaguely regulated by the public authorities (see CNE, 2016 for a review on the evolution of legislation 
concerning class size and composition). In general, schools were mandated by law to translate each school-grade-
year specific student heterogeneity across the respective classes, however with no concrete quantitative bounds on 
what it means to comply with that heterogeneity. 
The Portuguese system contains a regular academic track and other tracks related to vocational education and 
other alternative educational paths. The regular track is by far the most demanded and we consider only these 
students.6 Further, regular academic track students are required to choose one specific upper-secondary level course 
when enrolling in grade 10 with the general options available being (1) exact sciences, (2) socio-economic sciences, 
(3) humanities/languages, and (4) arts/music (it may be the case that some schools may offer only a subset of these). 
Upper-secondary schools’ classes, in general, group students that opted for the same upper-secondary course. 
Finally, it is important to mention that there have been changes during the period here considered in the way 
students can gain access to socioeconomic aid (which combine multiple discounts, such as reduced prices on school 
meals, transports, and textbooks). Whether students gained access to such discounts determines which ones we 
consider to belong to a low-income household. Although throughout the period analyzed the main philosophy behind 
the granting of the discounts has been constant – access conditional on sufficiently low per capita income at the 
household level – in 2008/09 there were two major changes (which were maintained until the last year of the dataset 
used). First, the determination of families’ income levels ceased to be done at the school level and became directly 
linked to their family allowance category (determined by the central government).7 Second, the income thresholds to 
accept a given family into one of the two major socioeconomic support levels, A and B, were relaxed. These two 
changes induced an increase in the proportion of students taking both levels, namely level A (the one we use as 
reference). We present the increase of the share of low-income students in the next Section, which details the dataset 
used. 
 
 
6 Although we focus on segregation of students of the regular academic track across schools and across classes, we recognize 
that segregation of students across educational tracks is an interesting case for future analysis. 
7 The formula to determine families’ income up to 2007/08 was regulated by the central government and thus common across 
them. However, the incumbency to check the veracity of each of the formula’s components (gross family income, health and 
housing expenditures, taxes and social security payments, and number of children) was on the local school side. The common 
perception, up to 2007/08, was that in the end this process gave schools the possibility to exert different levels of effort in 
checking the correctness of those figures, or that different schools with different administrative resources could act differently 
whenever doubts regarding the figures reported by families were raised. The 2008/09 reform was partly justified to make the 
process fairer to all families in the country in the sense that per capita income levels became determined by a central government 
procedure instead of being determined/confirmed at the local school level. 
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4 Data 
The database used is MISI dataset, which is an administrative dataset collected by the Portuguese Ministry of 
Education. We use information on all students enrolled in public schools (in the regular academic track), in 
continental Portugal8, from grades 1 to 12, and from 2006/07 to 2016/17. In other words, the majority of students 
enrolled in the Portuguese public educational system throughout more than a decade. Table A2 (Appendix A) details 
the actual shares of students enrolled in the regular academic track and in public schools by cycle over time. In short, 
students enrolled in that track and, simultaneously, in public schools, comprise the large majority across cycles 1 
through 3, and roughly half during upper-secondary (cycle 4). This information set is quite comprehensive, spanning, 
per year and on average (pooling all grades), around 1 million individual students, over about 5000 different schools, 
across all 278 municipalities of continental Portugal. Unlike earlier studies focused on the Portuguese case, external 
validity of our results should, in principle, not be an issue of concern (see discussion in Section 2). 
Several students’ characteristics are available, as well as about their parents. In order to compute the measures 
of segregation we use information with respect to student and respective parents’ place of birth, whether the student 
belongs to a low-income household, and students’ age. From these characteristics we compute three dichotomous 
variables: low-income, at least one retention, and immigrant. Pupils with at least one retention are defined as those 
whose age is strictly greater than the maximum expected age at the beginning of the academic year (set to September 
15th), making it an approximation to true retention. In turn, the maximum expected age is the maximum age the 
student may be observed with, at the beginning of the academic year, given the current grade she is enrolled in, under 
the scenario of not recording any retention since grade 1. These limiting ages start at 7 years old for 1st graders and 
increment by one year of age for each grade, so, by the 12th grade, it is 18 years old. Note that these are exact ages, 
so if a student is, say, 17.1 years old by September 15th and is enrolled in grade 11, then this student is given the 
status of having at least one retention. Not doing so would imply that the student had entered grade 1 aged 7.1 years 
old, which is not permitted. As explained in the previous Section, students must enroll in grade 1 aged 6 years old 
(or even 5 years old if they turn 6 between mid-September and December 31st), but not 7 or more.9 In turn, students 
are given the status of belonging to a low-income household if they benefit from the most intense level of 
socioeconomic support at school (level A), the one allowing free school meals. The last dichotomous variable – 
 
8 Students from the Atlantic islands’ autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira are not observed in the dataset. 
9 The inconvenience of approximating true retention status via comparison of actual and (maximum) expected age is to 
erroneously not attribute such status to a group of students that, by grade g, possess, simultaneously, two characteristics: to only 
have been truly retained once between 1st grade and grade g, and, to have been enrolled in grade 1 aged strictly less than 6 years-
old. The incidence of that error, however, is likely to be small. Note the following: (1) only around 29% of total students are 
born between 15th September and 31st December of any given year; (2) Madeira, Reis, Nunes, & Seabra (2018) state that, on 
average across school years, about 80% of students born between 15th September and 31st December enrol aged less than 6 years 
old (some parents opt to defer students’ entry age); and (3) Ikeda & García (2014) document, for Portugal, the actual retention 
rate is around 35% (percentage of 9th grade students reporting at least one retention – larger than the percentage of students with 
exactly one retention, PISA 2009 data). Multiplying all three percentages shows that only about 7% of the students in our dataset 
may have been given an erroneous retention status. Actually, the 7% figure is an upper bound of the true error incidence. As 
soon as some students of this particular group record a second, true, retention, then our approximation is again correct. On the 
bright side, our choice to not use true retentions, and instead an approximation, has the benefit that it is computable for all 
students. Even those that move from/to private schools or migrate. It does not rely on the ability to follow them over time, to 
then infer retention events by comparing grades in consecutive school-years within the student panel (which is not possible if 
within the student panel there are blanked school-years due to being enrolled in a school outside the continental Portugal public 
school system, e.g. a private school, or a school located in the Atlantic islands’ autonomous regions or in another country). 
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immigrant – attains value 1 if the student, or her mother, or her father, was not born in Portugal (if at least one of 
these three persons has missing information regarding place of birth then it counts as a missing observation).  
The use of most of these dichotomous variables is not uncommon in school segregation analysis, and they are 
also endowed with some practical virtues. Proxying economic status via free school meal status seems the best 
alternative to us, as it has no missing observations, whereas other variables present in our dataset, such as parent 
education, parent job status, and parent occupation, do possess non-marginal amounts of missing information (there 
is no information on parent wage or actual household income). Allen & Vignoles (2007), Bartholo (2013), Allen et 
al. (2015), and Bêa (2018) use similar or exactly the same dichotomous variable to identify low-income students. 
Alternatively, Murillo, & Martínez-Garrido (2018) and OECD (2019) identify them as those below certain percentiles 
of the ESCS socioeconomic index distribution (PISA data). This alternative, however, is not suited for our setting as 
an equivalent socioeconomic index is not present in the dataset and computing it based on parental related variables 
would run into the missing information problem. 
Identification of immigrant status of the student varies somewhat across studies, possibly depending on data 
availability on students’ (and parents’) nationalities and places of birth. For example, Bêa (2018) and Conger (2005) 
use only the students’ nationality and place of birth, respectively. Because we also possess information on parents’ 
place of birth we can identify as immigrants those also belonging to the second generation, which may well be subject 
to similar segregation pressures as first-generation immigrants. 
The division between students with at least one retention from those recording none may be the least common 
way to distinguish low-achievers from other students. Alternatively, OECD (2019) categorizes as low-achievers those 
scoring in the bottom quartile of the PISA achievement distribution. Such a procedure in our setting is not impossible 
to implement as the dataset does possess students’ scores on national exams and on school-internal evaluations per 
subject. However, both sets of scores have serious drawbacks for our purposes in this study (besides also presenting 
non-marginal amounts of missing cases whenever such information is expected to exist). On one hand, the external 
scores are specific to certain grade/school-year combinations, which consequently precludes us from computing 
segregation estimates for students enrolled in combinations with no external exams.10 On the other hand, the potential 
lack of comparability of school internal marks across teacher–by–school–by–school-year combinations (internal 
marking is a subjective exercise likely to be driven by factors that differ across these cells) makes it a doubtful 
exercise to identify any given student as top or low-achiever in a definite way using such marks. Because this is a 
necessary step to compute segregation estimates, a clean interpretation of the latter would be jeopardized if one were 
to use the former scores. We thus view the distinction between students with (approximated) zero or at least one 
retention as a reasonable way to distinguish students with different educational outcomes (with that distinction being 
reasonably coherent across school-years, grades, and places), while also implementable for the entire dataset.11 
 
10 During the period of our dataset only 9th and 12th graders possess, for every school-year, external scores. Fourth and 6th graders 
have such scores only for a subset of all school-years. All remaining grades possess no external scores for the period covered. 
11 We recognize that working with this variable has the drawback of not being able to compute academic segregation estimates 
for 1st graders, as these are not traditionally subject to retention. However, this is less restrictive than computing such estimates 
for 12th and 9th graders alone (and just some 4th and 6th graders’ cohorts). Such estimates should also be more coherent than 
academic segregation estimates based on internal scores, as different teachers may agree on an overall retention status more 
quickly than on specific marks for any particular student. 
 14 
 
The MISI dataset also provides information on school and class membership for each student, as well as schools’ 
locations (district and municipality), for each academic year.12 This information enables us to compute the 
segregation measures both between schools (within municipality) and within schools (across classes of the same 
grade). 
Figures A1 through A5 in Appendix A decompose the three minorities’ shares over time, across grades, across 
districts, across cycles over time, and across regions13 over time, respectively. In each Figure the first and second-
row graphs display the median shares of minorities taken from municipality-grade-year and school-grade-year 
distributions, respectively.14 As remarked at the end of the previous section, the increase in the share of low-income 
students is visible in the top left graphs of Figures A1 and A4. Around 5 p.p. comparing municipality-grade-year 
cases from 2008/09 with the two previous school-years in the former, and around 5 to 10 p.p. depending on the cycle 
for the latter. The bottom graphs of Figures A1 to A5 do not pool school-grade-year cases from grades 1 – 4 due to 
mixed-grade classes, and the medians thus do not take these into consideration; this explains why top and bottom 
graphs show slightly different patterns. 
 
5 Methodology 
As mentioned in the literature review, segregation has been measured through the dissimilarity index 𝐷𝑢𝑔𝑡: 
 𝐷𝑢𝑔𝑡 =
1
2
∑ |
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
−
𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
|
𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑡
𝑠=1
=
1
2
∑|?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1 − ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
0 |
𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑡
𝑠=1
 (1) 
for statistical unit u (statistical sub-units s nested within u), at grade g, and time period t. In our case, the statistical 
units will be the municipalities for the between-school segregation measures and the schools for the within-school 
ones. The corresponding statistical sub-units will be the schools for the former, and the classes for the latter. 𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑡 is 
the appropriate total number of schools (classes) observed in the municipality (school) u, in which there are students 
of grade g, in period t. The index is then half of the summation (over all 𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑡 sub-units s of u) of the absolute 
differences between the proportions of minority and majority students found in a given sub-unit s, ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1 =
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
 
and ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
0 =
𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
, respectively. Note that these proportions measure the incidence of each group of students, 
found in a given sub-unit, relative to each group size at the unit level, not the share of each type of student in that 
sub-unit relative to the sub-unit’s size. Accordingly, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑔𝑡 (𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑔𝑡) is the number of minority (majority) 
students found in sub-unit s, enrolled in grade g, in period t, while 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡 (𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡) is the unit level 
counterpart. 
 
12 Continental Portugal is administratively divided into 18 districts, each containing several municipalities, see Map A1. 
13 Whereas districts group municipalities, we define five regions grouping contiguous districts in order to simplify the exposition 
of some results over time. The assignment of districts to regions, although ad-hoc, is based on common knowledge regarding 
their social and demographic similarities (as well as on their geographical proximity). All minority shares (and all segregation 
measures presented in Section 6) are computed at the school or municipality level, but their estimates’ presentation is simplified 
(using the median) at the district or region level when assessing geographical patterns. Map A1 shows how districts were assigned 
to the five regions. 
14 These distributions pool only cases of well-defined segregation for each relevant segregation dimension. Section 5 details what 
we consider a unit-grade-year to be a case of well-defined segregation. 
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 The dissimilarity index is interpreted as the percentage of minority or majority students located in unit u 
(municipality or school), enrolled in grade g, in period t, who would have to change their current sub-unit (school or 
class) to achieve a completely even distribution.  
As earlier studies point out, e.g. Carrington & Troske (1997) and Allen et al. (2015), the classic dissimilarity 
index expressed by equation (1) is a measure of segregation in the sense of accounting how unevenly students may 
be distributed across classes or schools, while not measuring the purposefulness of such distribution as the result of 
agents’ actions. Indeed, Allen et al. (2015) and Carrington & Troske (1997) show that usually some level of 
distributional unevenness is perfectly coherent with a random allocation process of individuals to sub-units. This is 
an important observation as we are interested in measuring systematic segregation in the sense of systematic 
deviations from whatever the level of unevenness that may be aligned with a random allocation process. The actual 
segregation measure used in this paper follows a recent reformulation proposed by Allen et al. (2015) of the 
dissimilarity index, which intends to measure systematic segregation more closely related with purposeful actions by 
the relevant actors (students, families, school authorities), and which is more robust to cases in which certain 
fundamental parameters approach extreme values that render the problem of segregation not well defined. Before 
delving into this new index and detailing what we consider to be well-defined cases of segregation, we first 
summarize the main technical properties offered by the classic dissimilarity index (which its recent robust version 
inherits) that have been advanced across several studies (e.g. Duncan & Duncan, 1955; Hutchens, 2001; and Allen 
& Vignoles, 2007; among others as reviewed in Section 2). 
 The dissimilarity index is 0-1 bounded, 𝐷𝑢𝑔𝑡 ∈ [0,1], with value zero meaning all sub-units possess exactly 
the same minority/majority proportions as observed in the whole unit (which can be labeled as the fair shares, 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡+𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
 and 
𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡+𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
, respectively), hence no segregation, and with value 1 (i.e. 
𝐷𝑢𝑔𝑡 = 100%) reflecting maximum possible segregation, or, equivalently, the need to displace all of the minority 
(or majority) students from their currently assigned sub-units in order to achieve a perfectly even distribution of both 
types of students across all sub-units. The index also belongs to a family of indexes known as segregation curve 
indexes. The segregation curve is analogous to the income/wealth inequality curve. It can be shown that whereas the 
area between the diagonal (i.e. the segregation curve attained under a perfectly even distribution of minority students 
across sub-units) and the observed segregation curve is exactly the Gini index, the dissimilarity index simply 
measures the maximum distance between those two curves (empirically both indexes are usually quite correlated). 
Finally, the dissimilarity index satisfies a set of desirable principles: (1) scale/composition invariance – the index 
does not vary in the face of a change in the number of minority or majority students, as long as the minority/majority 
proportions 𝑝𝑠𝑔𝑡
1  and 𝑝𝑠𝑔𝑡
0  remain unchanged across all 𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑡 sub-units; (2) symmetry in groups – index does not vary 
if sub-units are reordered in the formula of equation (1); (3) principle of transfers – index does change whenever a 
minority student is transferred from one sub-unit to another as long as (i) that transfer changes minority proportions 
in both sub-units, (ii) the two sub-units involved (s and s’) have pre-transfer minority proportions ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1  and ?̂?𝑠′𝑔𝑡
1  
below and above the minority fair share; (4) organizational equivalence – index does not change if sub-units are 
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equally and proportionally divided into several sub-sub-units; (5) symmetry between types – index does not change 
if types “minority” and “majority” are swapped in the formula of equation (1).15 
 The segregation measure used in this paper, 𝐷𝑑𝑐,𝑢𝑔𝑡, follows a recent reformulation of the dissimilarity index 
proposed by Allen et al. (2015) – equation (3.4) in their article – and takes the form 
 𝐷𝑑𝑐,𝑢𝑔𝑡 =
1
2
∑ ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑛(?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡) (2) 
where the subscript dc stands for “density-corrected” as proposed in the reference. Moreover, we have 
 ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡 = √
?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1 (1 − ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1 )
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
+
?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
0 (1 − ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
0 )
𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑢𝑔𝑡
  
 
 ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡 =
|?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1 − ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
0 |
?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
  
and 
 𝑛(?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡) = {
0   ,         ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1
?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡 , ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡 > 1
  
The density-corrected index is such that a value of zero is assigned to the contribution of sub-unit s toward the unit 
level segregation quantity, whenever this sub-unit exhibits a difference (in absolute value) between the proportions 
of minority and majority students that is less than ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡. In turn, ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡, is the estimated standard deviation of the random 
variable “?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
1 − ?̂?𝑠𝑔𝑡
0 ”. Intuitively, this can be seen as canceling the contributions (toward the unit level segregation 
quantity) of the sub-units whose differences of proportions are relatively small compared to the estimated variability 
of such differences, or, in other words, not allowing sub-units with relatively too noisy differences of proportions to 
affect the unit level estimate of segregation. Doing so ensures that the unit level segregation quantity is not driven by 
potentially large differences of proportions (at the sub-unit level) that could have potentially been much smaller had 
the sample been slightly different than the one observed. 
As noted above, there are two main advantages of measuring segregation via the density-corrected 
dissimilarity index than via the classic one. On one hand, it measures systematic segregation beyond segregation 
consistent with random allocation of students to sub-units. On the other hand, it is more robust to cases in which 
important parameters such as unit level minority share and unit sizes approach certain extreme values that render the 
problem of segregation not well defined. Nevertheless, even the recently proposed index will exhibit some inflation 
– a mechanical upward bias of the index as those parameters approach zero (e.g. due to the number of minority 
students being markedly lower than the number of sub-units to which they are distributed, causing a surge of 
“spurious” unevenness at the unit level as complete evenness is impossible to achieve) – though less so than the 
classic index. It is then important to define the parameters’ space in which the measurement of segregation occurs 
with no or little inflation bias. Figures A6 and A7 (Appendix A) collect all scatterplots of number/share of minority 
 
15 The square root index (Hutchens, 2001 and Hutchens, 2004) satisfies the same list of principles and even a stronger version of 
the principle of transfers in which requirement (ii) does not have to be imposed. Nevertheless, we still prefer to work with the 
dissimilarity index as it is a popular measure – and thus easier to compare results. 
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students against the average segregation measured by both indexes.16 Clearly, as the number and share of minority 
students approach zero, both the classic and the density corrected indexes exhibit an upward trend, regardless of 
segregation dimension or level of analysis. In turn, graphs in the first row of Figure A8 (Appendix A) show the same 
pattern for average school sizes (averaging across all schools belonging to the same municipality-grade-year), though 
less pronouncedly. Its second row graphs show that average class size seems to not exhibit extremely inflating 
behavior, at least excluding non sensical class sizes of fewer than 10 students or more than 30 (which result from a 
minority of cases with a mismatch between administratively recorded and actual class sizes). Overall, these inflating 
patterns align with earlier research, e.g. Carrington & Troske (1997) and Allen et al. (2015). 
Figures A6-A8 also show that the density-corrected dissimilarity index is, as expected, more conservative in 
measuring systematic segregation than the classic one. Roughly, the largest “corrections” are brought about when 
the parameters are close to zero, but not too close. 
Across all scatterplots of Figures A6-A8 we also depict thresholds (vertical dashed lines) for each parameter 
that we consider to delimit the cases in which segregation is well defined. In short, we keep the cases that comply 
with the following restrictions: (i) units with 10 or more minority students; (ii) units with two or more sub-units; (iii) 
average school size of at least 30 students for municipality-level analysis, or average class size between 10 and 30 
students (including) for school-level analysis; (iv) units with share of minority students between 10 and 90 percent; 
(v) units with at most 10% of share of students with missing information with respect to the relevant dichotomous 
variable; and (vi) units with at least 80% of the corresponding sub-units having at most 20% of students with missing 
information with respect to the relevant dichotomous variable. Tables A3 through A8 (Appendix A) decompose both 
the original sample and the one complying with all the restrictions just outlined, across the 18 districts of continental 
Portugal, the 12 grades, and all of the academic years from 2006/07 to 2016/17. They also provide information on 
how many cases are “lost” due to each of the abovementioned restrictions (i) through (vi). The final restricted sample 
consists of all cases complying with all six restrictions at the same time. Because there are cases not complying with 
just one of the restrictions, as well as cases not complying, simultaneously, with two or more restrictions, the final 
percentage of “surviving” cases does not have to be the product of all shares respecting each restriction alone. 
However, these shares are still informative regarding which ones are more likely to act as bottlenecks for the final 
restricted sample. 
While not pretending to be exhaustive in the interpretation of all patterns across all these Tables (A3-A8), a 
few comments are due: (1) the percentage of cases in which we see segregation to be well defined is larger at the 
school-grade-year level (within-school segregation) than at the municipality-grade-year level (between-school 
segregation), which seems to be driven by larger shares of school-grade-year cases surviving restrictions (ii) and (iii); 
(2) the percentage of well-defined cases with respect to economic and academic segregation are higher than the 
percentages of such cases for the immigrant dimension (this is explained by the clustering of students with immigrant 
background in the densest urban areas of Lisboa, Setúbal, and Faro – in line with the findings of Justino et al. (2017) 
– rendering schools or municipalities outside those areas less likely to comply with restrictions (i) and (iv) for that 
 
16 These scatterplots were produced using the Stata command binscatter, using the discrete option, see Stepner (2013). Dots of 
the same color almost always represent different amounts of observations, i.e. they represent only those unit-grade-years with 
the exact same value in the horizontal axis. The averages of D or Ddc are then taken across all unit-grade-years sharing the same 
horizontal axis value. 
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dimension in particular)17; (3) the percentages of well-defined cases with respect to economic and academic 
segregation seem to be higher across schools and municipalities located in more densely populated districts such as 
Lisboa, Porto, Setúbal, and Faro; while some northern, less urbanized, districts such as Vila Real, Viana do Castelo, 
and Viseu have relatively large shares of surviving school-grade-year cases of well-defined within-school economic 
segregation in particular (Figure A3 shows that these are some of the districts with the largest median shares of low-
income students in the country, and are therefore more likely to comply with restrictions (i) and (iv)); and (4) there 
are none to very few well defined cases of academic segregation in grades 1 and 2 at the municipality level (retentions 
are not practiced on 1st graders, and by grade 2 the share of students with at least one retention is still not as large as 
in subsequent grades); and, at the school level, no segregation dimension was considered for the whole arc of primary 
schooling grades – 1 through 4 – given the relatively high incidence of mixed-grade classes.18 
To sum up, our choice of Ddc over D is based on the combination of several reasons: (1) it is an improvement 
on the popular dissimilarity index, meaning that there exist several instances to compare our results with, and, 
conversely, it is more likely for others to be able to compare their findings with those from the Portuguese case that 
we bring here; (2) it inherits from the classic dissimilarity index the same interpretation and other useful properties 
(e.g. 0-1 bounded; not dependent on minority share, hence comparable across units and time; only requires 
dichotomous students’ characteristics); and (3) it captures systematic segregation in a more robust way, exhibiting 
less bias under small values of minority share and of unit sizes than D. In turn, our preference for the density-corrected 
dissimilarity index over the other indexes proposed in Allen et al. (2015) (and over others such as Carrington & 
Troske, 1997) is grounded on two factors: (1) it is the most suited for our very large dataset encompassing millions 
of student-level observations as it does not require extensive reassignment procedures (of all individual students to 
actual schools or classes) in the spirit of bootstrapping as the alternatives do, and (2) it is shown in Allen et al. (2015), 
through Monte Carlo simulations, to actually be more bias-correcting than the alternatives. 
 
 
17 The second most urbanized area of Portugal – Porto – is clearly the exception, because the number of foreign students living 
there is small compared with its total student population (although the number of foreign students living there is quite sizeable 
compared to the total number of foreign students of the country). Moreover, it is important to mention that we have found, in 
ongoing parallel research devoted to analyzing the types of immigrant students found in different areas of the country, that they 
can be grouped into two main types. One has to do with students whose cultural background is Brazilian, African (Portuguese 
speaking countries), or Eastern European. The other has to do with students born in countries that are usually targets of 
Portuguese emigration (e.g. France and Switzerland) having both parents born in Portugal, or, if born in Portugal possessing one 
parent also born in Portugal and the other born in one of these Portuguese emigration countries. The first group clusters, to a 
great deal, in the districts of Lisboa, Setúbal, and Faro, whereas the second in center and northern districts. 
18 Mixed-grade classes complicate the interpretation of the segregation index at the school level. The interpretation of the school 
level index presumes that one may change the allocation of students across classes freely. In cases of single grade classes, the 
only evident restriction is to allow such allocative changes to happen only across classes of the same grade (and school). 
However, this becomes blurrier when classes include students of more than one grade. Possible solutions would be to allow 
students of a given grade to move to any class containing at least one other student from that grade, or to allow such movements 
only across classes whose majority of students happen to be of that same grade. Nevertheless, these options either allow moving 
students of a given grade to classes unlikely to be able to receive them (those classes where the students of that grade are a clear 
minority), or “forget” some of the students (those that happen to be the minority in classes of other grades). Other ongoing 
research – Araújo, Costa, Crato, D’Hombres et al. (2019) – documents, also using the MISI dataset for school-years 2006/07 
through 2015/16, that roughly between 20% to 30% of 1st cycle students stayed at least one school-year in one mixed-grade 
class, and about the same values apply for the percentage of 1st cycle classes containing more than one grade. 
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6 Segregation Estimates 
In this Section we present the estimates of each of the six segregation cases we are interested in – economic, 
academic, and immigrant segregation dimensions at between and within-school levels. The estimates are presented 
in Figures 1 and 2 below which decompose them across time and grades, respectively.19 These estimates refer to 
percentiles 25 (light grey), 50 (median; dark grey), and 75 (black) of segregation, as measured by the density-
corrected dissimilarity index (Ddc), in which the percentiles are taken from the distribution (of segregation estimates) 
obtained by pooling all unit-grade-years that (i) are cases of well-defined segregation, and (ii) share the same 
horizontal axis category. Recall that “unit” is municipality for between-school segregation measures (first row plots), 
whereas it is school for within-school ones (second row plots). The horizontal dashed series represent percentiles 25, 
50, and 75 (of segregation estimates) taken from pooling all unit-grade-years that are just cases of well-defined 
segregation, and are therefore constant across horizontal axis categories. Every percentile possesses 95% confidence 
intervals. 
The first main insight is the time invariance of median segregation (P50), across all six cases shown in Figure 
1, for the decade 2006/07 – 2016/17. The evolution of median segregation seems to exhibit only very faint and linear 
trends for the cases of academic and immigrant within-school segregation: positive and negative, respectively. 
The main exception is the drop of median between-school economic segregation from 2007/08 to 2008/09. 
Recall from Section 3 that from 2008/09 on the procedure to attribute socioeconomic support to families changed, 
with this change allowing families with somewhat higher income levels to gain access to levels of support for which 
they were earlier not eligible. At the end of Section 4 we noted that the increase in this minority share varied, roughly, 
from 5 to 10 p.p. depending on cycle of studies. This means that several students defined as low-income from 2008/09 
on would not be defined as such had they been subject to the previous rules. The drop should, then, reflect a break in 
the series rather than a structural change in economic segregation, motivated by at least two factors. First, previous 
to the reform, the fewer (flagged as) low-income students were more likely to be found only in specific schools of 
the municipality due to the combination of residential segregation and school catchment areas. The reform is likely 
to have increased the probability of finding the “new” low-income students more scattered across the schools of any 
given municipality, thereby contributing to the drop of this type of segregation. Second, as the attribution of free 
school meal status ceased to be decided at the school level (it passed to the central government level) it may also be 
the case that school level tradition, culture, or simply technical capacity ascertaining whether a given student truly 
belonged to a low-income household or not, ceased to be another source of between-school economic segregation. 
With central government determining which students belong to a low-income household or not, the attribution of this 
status across students (of different schools of the same municipality) may have been homogenized. This may have 
decreased between-school economic segregation because the likelihood for students from different schools to obtain 
that status simply became more balanced. 
It is also noticeable the absence of visible patterns for both between and within-school economic segregation 
during the severe economic crisis that began around 2010 and had its apogee during the external economic 
 
19 Figure B1 of Appendix B shows the segregation estimates across districts of continental Portugal. Appendix B contains all 
Figures and discussion related to regional differences of the segregation estimates. 
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intervention between mid-2011 and mid-2014. It seems that the economic crisis had no impact on student economic 
segregation. 
The final insight we take from Figure 1 is the fact that throughout the period considered, median within-school 
academic segregation was greater than the other two remaining segregation dimensions. Compared to these other two 
dimensions, which recorded median segregation levels of around 15%, the former recorded a higher median index 
by around 10 p.p., i.e. around 25%. This fact gains importance taking into consideration that Portugal is one of the 
OECD countries with the highest retention rate (see Figure 1 of Ikeda & García, 2014). It shows that within-school 
academic segregation affects a substantial portion of Portuguese students (especially as they progress in grade, see 
our Figure A2). The same qualitative difference (greater academic than economic segregation) is observed at 
between-school level (not within-school as herein) in Figure 3.1 of OECD (2019) for Portugal, though there are some 
important differences in the way we and OECD (2019) define low-income students and pupils with a low academic 
record.20 Moreover, they use the classic dissimilarity index, not the density-corrected one, and compute between-
school segregation at the country level, not at the municipal level, as we do. 
In contrast to the school-years profile the grade-segregation profile (Figure 2) is richer in observable patterns. 
Looking at between-school segregation (first row graphs) one notices that across all three dimensions the highest 
median segregation levels are attained during cycle 1 (grades 1 to 4), at around 17% to 19%. It then falls to around 
12% to 14%, depending on dimension, during cycle 2 (grades 5 and 6). Throughout cycle 3 (grades 7 to 9) it either 
increases a bit to around 15% (economic and academic dimensions) or stays around the previous cycle level 
(immigrant dimension). During cycle 4, (grades 10 to 12), median segregation levels decrease again, namely those 
related to economic and immigrant dimensions. 
We view these patterns (constant within but varying across cycles of studies) reflecting, at least to some degree, 
latent residential segregation through the varying granularity of the networks of schools that offer each cycle (see 
Table A1). Primary schools, which offer cycle 1, are the most frequent and widespread schools in the country. The 
top row graphs of Figure A9 (Appendix A) show that the median number of schools, for each sample of well-defined 
cases of segregation, is largest during grades 1 to 4: around 7 to 10 schools in a given municipality-grade-year. This, 
combined with the fact that between-school allocation of students is influenced by school catchment areas and 
students’ residency, may explain why primary schools seem to receive minority and majority types of students in a 
relatively more unbalanced way. In short, these schools should attract students from more local and homogeneous 
neighborhoods (within a given municipality), so it would be necessary to reallocate a higher proportion of minority 
(or majority) students across the municipality’s primary schools to achieve a completely even minority/majority 
distribution. 
This same argument may be applied to the lower between-school segregation levels observed during cycle 2. 
The network of schools offering cycle 2 grades (which, for certain, also offer cycle 3) is less widespread than that 
constituted by primary schools (top row of Figure A9 reports a median of about 3 schools per municipality-grade-
year supplying that cycle, which corresponds to approximately a third that of primary schools). It is then expectable, 
and supported by what is shown in Figure 2, that cycle 2 schools attract students less locally and with a more 
diversified background than the latter schools do.  
 
20 We do not possess a socioeconomic index like the ESCS, just information on free school meal take up; and we do not take 
into account test scores (OECD, 2019 uses reading PISA scores). 
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Grades 7 to 9 – cycle 3 – report, in general, higher median between-school segregation levels than those reported 
throughout the grades of the cycles immediately before and after them. Again, a good candidate explanation is the 
(higher) granularity of the network of schools offering grades 7 to 9 as compared to those of schools offering cycles 
2 and 4. In fact, in any given municipality, grades 7 to 9 are always offered in schools with grades 5 and 6, and 
possibly so in schools offering grades 10 to 12. Consequently, the number of schools offering cycle 3 grades can only 
be equal to or greater than the number of schools offering cycle 2. In practice, the inequality holds more frequently. 
Figure A9 shows that, indeed, there are, on median, four schools housing 3rd cycle students (greater than three, the 
equivalent figure for cycle 2 students). 
In turn, in any given municipality, in general, the number of schools offering grades 7 to 9 is also greater than 
those offering grades 10 to 12. The latter schools form the least granular network within the public system as they 
offer the last cycle, the one least populated (2 to 3 schools, on median, per municipality-grade-year, according to 
Figure A9, depending on which sample we look at).21 Consequently, upper-secondary schools, again, should attract 
more heterogeneous students from wider areas, and indeed they seem to do so, as shown by the somewhat lower 
median between-school segregation levels reported in Figure 2 for grades 10 through 12. 
To conclude this particular discussion regarding the profile of between-school segregation and grades, we note 
that although all three dimensions of between-school segregation seem well described by the previous discussion, 
there are two peculiarities. First, median between-school segregation related to the immigrant dimension, across 
grades 7 to 9, is in line with that of the previous cycle (we would expect it to increase, as in the other two dimensions). 
Second, median between-school academic segregation seems to increase from grade 9 to 10 (the increase is more 
pronounced for percentile 75), to then attain a slight decrease by grade 12 (we would expect a visible decrease 
throughout the entire upper-secondary).  
Whereas the interpretation of the first case remains unclear to us, we interpret the second case as having to do 
with the choice students are required to make in terms of which course to enroll in at the beginning of grade 10 (as 
pointed out in Section 3). It is known that many schools offering upper-secondary grades (10 to 12) offer fewer 
regular courses than possible, in any given school-year. This makes the course choice also a school choice whenever, 
within any given municipality, not all upper-secondary schools offer the same set of courses. It is conceivable that 
students with different academic abilities (as roughly flagged by having at least one retention by the beginning of 
grade 10) tend to enroll in regular courses differing in academic difficulty (e.g. there is the view that the exact sciences 
course may be more academically demanding given the more complex mathematics involved in it, as compared, for 
example, with the humanities course, which makes students go through less demanding mathematical contents). Such 
a mechanism would translate into students of similar academic ability clustering in specific upper-secondary schools 
within the municipality, thereby sourcing upward pressure on academic segregation. In turn, this upward pressure is 
likely to balance the negative one from a less granular network of schools, thus explaining the particular peculiarity 
that between-school academic segregation does not decrease from cycle 3 to 4 (not as much as it does with respect 
to the economic and immigrant dimensions). 
 
21 Some students leave the upper-secondary when turning 18 years-old. On top of this, there are other tracks available at the end 
of 9th grade, namely vocational and professional tracks, which absorb another non-marginal portion of individuals (see Table 
A2). 
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Within-school segregation presents two distinct profiles with respect to school grades (second row of Figure 2). 
The first is a constant level of median segregation during cycles 2 and 3 (grades 5 through 9). It is around 15% to 
17% for economic and immigrant dimensions, and around 21% for the academic one. These are the cycles through 
which regular track students have no choices to make regarding courses or classes. Because of this fact we view these 
segregation levels as reflecting, mostly, choices of school authorities (parents may also have some impact on within-
school placements through informal bargaining, although the final responsibility on actual classes’ composition 
resides entirely with the school authorities). Recall that schools are mandated to compose classes reflecting the 
school-grade-year specific student heterogeneity. Perfect compliance with that rule would mean null within-school 
segregation levels because all classes would record the fair shares of minority/majority students, i.e. each class would 
absorb balanced proportions of each type of student from the school-grade-year observed pool. The empirical 
evidence just presented suggests that, on median, that mandate is not perfectly complied with, at least during cycles 
2 and 3. This is consistent with the fact that schools are not provided with exact quantitative bounds on what it means 
to comply with the school-grade-year observed heterogeneity, thus leaving room for schools to deviate from null 
segregation. On the other hand, the empirical results also reveal that the magnitude of the deviation is, at best, mild, 
on median, taking into account that the observed levels of within-school segregation could theoretically be as high 
as 100%. 
The second distinct profile with respect to school grades has to do with the upper-secondary (grades 10 to 12). 
Given that upper-secondary classes tend to group students that opted for the same upper-secondary course, the 
students’ choices may result in student-induced within-school segregation. This is so because students with similar 
academic aptitudes tend to take the same courses22 and, indirectly, make themselves be found in the same upper-
secondary school classes. This seems to match the empirical estimates observed in the second row of Figure 2, namely 
those related to the economic and academic dimensions. Between these two cases it is that of academic within-school 
segregation that strikes the most. Whereas throughout grades 5 to 9 the median revolves around 21%, it jumps by 
almost 25 p.p. to about 45% by grade 10. In other words, it would be necessary, on median, in any given upper-
secondary school, to redistribute almost half of the 10th graders recording at least one retention, across the existing 
classes, in order to achieve a completely even distribution. Grades 11 and 12 then show a progressive decrease to 
30%, which is still about 10 p.p. higher than the median levels observed until 9th grade.  
This result is somewhat at odds with that from Holfve-Sabel (2015), who found that students may counteract 
within-school (immigrant) segregation via their inclusive decisions about whom to work with during lessons. 
Nevertheless, such apparent discord might be explained by at least two factors: (1) the fact that Holfve-Sabel’s study 
deals with 6th graders while our result arises from decisions of older students (9th to 10th graders), who may possess 
different inclusiveness preferences, or (2) with the idea that despite pursuing immigrant background inclusiveness, 
students may not pursue inclusiveness in terms of academic ability, especially when it comes to such a long-lasting 
decision as the choice of an academic track (which clearly contrasts with the short-lived decision of whom to work 
with during lessons).  
 
22 This academic ability concentration also seems to be the case for the French school system. As described by Rapoport & 
Thibout (2018), almost all students found in the most demanding French universities attended the same secondary sciences 
course and, likewise, secondary students graduating from this course are the most able to pursue any course at university level. 
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The case of within-school economic segregation is less striking, but it also presents an increase of median 
segregation of about 5 p.p. (from 15% to 20%) between grades 9 and 12. Median immigrant within-school segregation 
does not vary much across grades. Overall, academic characteristics of the students seem to play an important role 
in how they end up distributed across classes of any given school, and a very important one across classes of upper-
secondary schools. Meanwhile, economic and immigrant statuses seem to play less important roles, though still non-
null ones. 
We also analyzed all six segregation cases by cycle of studies over time (Figures A10 and A11 in Appendix 
A).23 Aside from showing that the series break of between-school economic segregation was felt more heavily for 
cycle 1 students (and much less for those in cycle 4), Figure A10 does not show major changes over time of median 
segregation levels by cycle. Bêa (2018) also detected a very similar profile for between-school economic segregation 
from 2006/07 to 2015/16, for cycle 1 students in the municipality of Lisboa, as the one presented in Figure A10 
(which takes into account not only that municipality, but all other municipalities of the country for which between-
school economic segregation is well-defined). Although Bêa’s (2018) estimates for this type of segregation are larger 
than ours for every comparable school-year by a mark-up of 20-35 p.p. (she uses the classic dissimilarity index, 
which yields larger estimates than its density-corrected version and looks only at Lisboa municipality, which also 
tends to exhibit higher between-school segregation than the country), we agree on the size of the fall from 2007/08 
to 2008/09: she estimates a drop of about 21 p.p. whereas we calculate it to be around 17 p.p., for 1st cycle students. 
In turn, the estimates of between-school immigrant segregation in Bêa (2018) show a constant profile over time, just 
as our estimates do, but with a mark-up relative to ours of about 20 p.p.. 
Allen et al. (2015) report levels, also on between-school economic segregation for cycle 1 schools (2006 data), 
ranging between 16% and 30% across inner London local authorities with the density-corrected dissimilarity index. 
The Portuguese case, for the comparable segregation dimension and cycle, seems, on median, to fall within the lower 
half of that band since at least 2008/09.24 Moreover, the Portuguese between-school economic segregation levels may 
also be aligned with those from Rio de Janeiro Municipal Schools. According to Bartholo (2013) the between-school 
economic segregation levels there, applying the classic dissimilarity index on students from grades 1 through 9, are 
close to 25%. This level of segregation may diminish to values closer to what we obtain here under the density-
corrected dissimilarity index for each comparable cycle. In turn, comparing our results to those from Murillo & 
Martínez-Garrido (2018) that estimate between-school economic segregation for European countries (including 
Portugal), with PISA 2015 data, using the G index, we note that whereas their estimate for Portugal is 36% (38% for 
Spain), which would translate in terms of D to around 40% to 50%25, our most comparable estimate (mid-left graph 
of Figure A10, cycle 3 series, academic years 2014/15 and 2015/16) is below 15%, a much lower level (though at 
municipality level, not at the country level as in the reference). Furthermore, Figure A10 confirms that, in general, 
between-school segregation tended to be higher for cycle 1 students, and lower for cycle 4. This is reversed regarding 
 
23 Figures A10, A11, B2, and B3 in Appendices A and B are graphically heavy as they portray, for the sake of completeness, all 
combinations of levels of analysis (2), with segregation dimensions (3), with percentiles (3), by cycles and regions (2), thus 
totalling 36 different graphs. To keep the discussion in the text succinct we restrict the subsequent analysis to the patterns of the 
medians only (middle row graphs of each Figure). 
24 Municipalities, though, are likely to be larger regions than inner London LAs, so comparability may not be exact. 
25 Applying the formula of footnote 3 and taking 24% as the share of low-income students, as per top-left graph of Figure A4, 
cycle 3 series, academic years 2014/15 and 2015/16. 
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within-school segregation (Figure A11), since economic and (especially) academic unevenness levels for cycle 4 
were the largest throughout the whole period.  
We can further relate, in at least three ways, our findings with respect to between and within-school immigrant 
segregation with those documented in Conger (2005), who analyzed these two phenomena across and within public 
elementary schools of the New York City (NYC) school district, between 1995/96 and 2000/01. First, in the NYC 
case immigrant students enrolled in grade 5 tended to be more segregated both between and within-schools than their 
grade 1 counterparts. We observe the reverse. Figure A10 shows 1st cycle students (grades 1 through 4) subject to 
median between-school immigrant segregation significantly higher, not lower, than that for 2nd cycle pupils (grades 
5 and 6), over almost all school-years (we cannot compare with the within-school estimates shown in Figure A11 
since, as explained above, we do not compute that level of segregation for 1st cycle students). Second, being able to 
compare immigrant and racial segregation levels across and within the same schools, Conger (2005) observes that 
“total” immigrant segregation is lower than “total” racial segregation.26 A crude extrapolation to the Portuguese case 
of this finding would suggest that the estimates here provided, relative to median immigrant segregation, are possibly 
lower bounds of actual median racial/ethnic segregation levels. Evidently, lacking information on the actual 
racial/ethnic category of the students, we cannot confirm or rule-out this hypothesis. Nevertheless, we believe it 
would be important to test it in the future, given the likely racial/ethnic diversity of the Portuguese student population 
(see Hortas, 2013, Abrantes et al., 2016, and Araújo, 2016). Lastly, our estimates agree with those of Conger (2005) 
qualitatively, as both studies conclude that between and within-school immigrant segregation levels have equal 
magnitudes (15% in our case). 
Regarding percentiles 25 and 75 of all six cases of segregation presented there are no significant qualitative 
differences to add to the above discussion based on the median. These other two percentiles follow, in general, the 
same patterns of the latter. However, these two percentiles convey interesting information related to the degree of 
dispersion of the unit-grade-year segregation distributions. In general, the interquartile range (the vertical distance 
between P75 and P25) of all series presented in Figures 1 and 2 revolve around 15 p.p., which indicates that in any 
given school-year, grade, or district, there is some heterogeneity in segregation estimates, implying heterogeneity in 
the way agents such as parents and school authorities contribute to observed segregation patterns. The case of within-
school academic segregation, however, should again be highlighted since it presents the largest interquartile range: 
around 20 to 25 p.p.. In other words, within a given school-year or grade, there are greater discrepancies in the way 
different schools’ authorities set up classes in terms of their composition with respect to students’ academic 
characteristics than in terms of their economic or immigrant composition. For example, looking at Figure 2 middle 
bottom graph, one can see that a quarter of schools containing 9th graders imposed on their students a level of 
academic segregation of less than 10%, whereas another quarter of such schools imposed a level of academic 
segregation of more than 33%. 
 
 
26 “Total” refers to the sum of between and within-school segregation components. The racial categories considered were: White, 
Black, Asian, and Hispanic. 
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6.1 Correlations 
So far we have described the profiles of the three segregation dimensions – economic, academic, and immigrant 
– in terms of time and grades (and districts in Appendix B). In this subsection we look at whether there are systematic 
associations between the most important variables at the root of the segregation phenomena, i.e. between all possible 
pairs of variables of minority shares and dimensions of segregation. We define an association to be systematic 
whenever there is a significant correlation between the pair of variables being compared, after partialling out, from 
both of them, municipality (or school whenever appropriate), grade, and year fixed effects, and holding fixed all other 
minority shares or segregation dimensions not belonging to the pair analyzed. Such a correlation coefficient tells us 
the level of association between the considered pair of variables that exists independently from statistical units, 
grades, and years’ specific factors (such as municipality/school specific time-invariant tendency to cluster specific 
types of students or to segregate in any particular way, or grades’ tendency to contain specific students or to be 
associated with specific geographic granularities of schools, or specific school-years’ regulations and policy 
regimes), as well as from confounding associations between minority shares and segregation dimensions outside the 
pair of variables analyzed. 
Table 2 shows the (partialled-out) correlation estimates (those larger than 0.2 in absolute value are bolded to 
highlight cases with no economically significant correlations from significant ones). Each estimate within the matrix 
was obtained in a two-stage procedure: first, municipality (or school), grade, and year fixed effects were partialled-
out from each municipality (or school) level variable present in the matrix; second, a partial correlation matrix was 
computed using the residuals of the regressions from the previous stage.27 
Looking first at the blocks of correlations related only with minority shares, we observe that (1) there are no 
visible correlations between minority shares at the municipality level (not larger than 0.2 in absolute value), (2) at 
the school level the share of students with at least one retention correlates positively with the share of low-income 
students (and seems to correlate also positively with the share of students with immigrant background, although 
weakly), and (3) the strongest correlations are reported at the intersection of the municipality and school levels, 
namely in that block main diagonal. These latter correlations mean the larger the minority shares at, say, municipal 
level, the larger the same minority shares at the schools of that municipality (the correlations are far from unity 
though, suggesting that variations in minority shares at one level are not 1-to-1 matched by equivalent variations on 
the other level; this is coherent with the students’ between-school allocation process as it must respect, to some extent, 
proximity to school, though not exactly, as students may enroll in schools located in a different municipality 
compared to that of their residence through the location of the parents’ jobs). 
 
 
27 The sample consists of school-grade-years that are, simultaneously (i) well-defined cases of segregation across all three 
segregation dimensions, and (ii) matched to the appropriate municipality-grade-years, which, in turn, also are well-defined cases 
of segregation across the same three dimensions. 
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Next, potential strong correlations in blocks that intersect minority shares and segregation levels could indicate 
that different compositions of student populations are systematically associated with different segregation patterns. 
There is one such case: the share of low-income students at the municipal level and between-school economic 
segregation, with an estimated and statistically significant correlation of -0.23. This figure implies that municipalities 
with larger shares of low-income students tend to exhibit lower levels of segregation of this type of student between 
their schools, though the relationship is not perfect. This particular result should not be an artifact of the measure of 
segregation chosen, as the dissimilarity index (and the density-corrected one) does not depend on the shares of 
minority/majority at the unit level, nor on ill-defined cases of segregation, as these were dropped from the analysis, 
nor even on the change of the rules to gain free school meal status (which herein identifies low-income students) as 
the year fixed effects ensure all year-specific factors (such as, precisely, year specific legislation) are not allowed to 
confound the estimates present in the matrix. Interestingly, the same relationship at the within-school level is almost 
nonexistent, with a correlation of just -0.06. It seems that it is “easier” to find an increasing proportion of low-income 
students, of a given municipality, spread out across its schools, than it is to find an increasing proportion of low-
income students, of a given school, spread out across its classes. 
Last, visible correlations in blocks that are intersections of different segregation measures provide information 
whether municipalities or schools that tend to separate/pull together students with a given characteristic do it in 
tandem or not with the way they allocate students with other characteristics. It is possible to observe from the matrix 
that one such relationship holds at both between and within-school levels: municipalities or schools where low-
income students are more segregated tend to be places where students with at least one retention are more segregated, 
too (correlations of 0.23 and 0.20, respectively, both statistically significant). A possible reason for this might be that 
low-income students tend to also be students with at least one retention. This is partly supported by the correlations 
between the shares of these two types of students: 0.13 (municipality level), and 0.32 (school level). Nevertheless, 
the small minority shares’ correlations leave room for other explanatory factors. Interestingly, the same relationship 
arises at the country level analysis of 15-year-old students’ between-school segregation by OECD (2019). Our 
correlations’ results, which explicitly control for a myriad of confounding factors (such as the grade, facilitating the 
comparison of our correlation results with those from OECD), not only confirm this, but also extend this fact to hold 
for the Portuguese municipalities and public schools. 
A possible criticism regarding the values presented in Table 2 is that they depend on a small fraction of the 
original population of school-grade-year cases (17,248 out of 68,605). This is induced by requiring that only school-
grade-year cases that are well-defined cases of segregation across all three dimensions simultaneously, and 
appropriately matched to the respective municipality-grade-year cases (well-defined cases of segregation themselves 
too), be used. A particular dimension that acts as bottleneck for well-defined segregation is the one related to 
immigrants. For this reason, we re-estimate the same partial correlations matrix disregarding the between and within-
school immigrant segregation measures and associated minority shares. This new matrix is reported in Table A9 
(Appendix A). It allows us to use more cases (N=26,503), which should be more representative of the entire country 
(recall that immigration was well-defined mostly only in Lisboa, Setúbal, and Faro districts). There are, however, no 
substantial changes in the estimates (signs, magnitudes, and precision levels). We thus keep the interpretation of the 
results found in Table 2. 
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7 Concluding Remarks 
In this study we have documented the most comprehensive description to date of the state of student segregation 
in Portugal, both between and within-schools. While we found that median segregation, at both levels of analysis, is 
not null, it may be categorized as being mild. Broadly speaking, it varied around 15% to 20% (percentage of minority 
students necessary to reallocate to achieve evenness) depending on minority dimension and on level of analysis. 
There are, however, specific cases in which segregation is more intense and other interesting patterns arise. 
Within-school academic segregation shows the highest levels. Given that within-school economic and 
immigrant segregation lag behind academic segregation we interpret this as evidence that academic characteristics 
of the students are somewhat more prioritized at the moment of forming classes, over their socioeconomic 
characteristics. This view, however, should be conditioned to grades 5 through 9, when students do not have to self-
select to specific courses. When they are asked to do so, by grade 10, within-school academic segregation increases 
sharply, reflecting the addition, above a “natural” segregation level imposed by school authorities, of segregation 
stemming from students’ own tracking decisions. In addition, within-school academic segregation also presents 
greater interquartile ranges, implying that within a given school-year or grade there are greater discrepancies in the 
way different schools’ authorities set up classes in terms of their academic composition than in terms of their 
economic or immigrant composition. These within-school segregation patterns may very well be impacting students’ 
educational and non-educational outcomes, in light of the literature on peer effects (e.g. Burke & Sass, 2013). 
Between-school segregation varies somewhat across primary, upper-primary, lower-secondary, and upper-
secondary, but much less across grades within each of these cycles. We believe this may be explained by the 
combination of two factors. First, different types of schools, supplying specific grades, possess varying geographical 
granularities. Municipalities with more schools are likely to exacerbate pre-existing residential segregation patterns. 
Second, the existence of school catchment areas reinforces the effect of the previous factor. It seems to force students 
with similar socioeconomic characteristics and living close together to attend the same school. As more schools are 
available in a given municipality, the more local (and the more homogeneous) the pool of students of any of the 
schools becomes. The case of primary students (grades 1 to 4) is the most salient regarding the combination of these 
two factors. 
The persistent and stable non-null median segregation levels (over more than a decade as we document here) 
point to a situation of long-run equilibrium. As documented in this study, some time-invariant factors help explain 
this situation (e.g. school catchment areas, different granularities of different networks of schools, or first tracking 
age). Nonetheless, persistent preferences/pedagogical beliefs relative to what constitutes the optimal placement of 
students (between and within-schools) from both parents and schools’ authorities may also explain such time 
consistency of segregation patterns. Indeed, Levy & Razin’s (2017) theoretical framework predicts, in particular, the 
possibility of persistent between-school segregation patterns due to parents’ (possibly incorrect) beliefs. In this view, 
the case of 5th to 9th graders with differing academic abilities subject to a somewhat more uneven placement within-
schools should again be highlighted. It is difficult to match it to any institutional feature (course tracking only kicks 
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in by grade 10) other than the vagueness of central regulations regarding class composition, quite probably filled in 
by the “optimal” behavior of local parents and, above all in this example, of local school authorities.28 
In turn, two patterns emerged on how different minority shares and different segregation phenomena relate with 
each other (after netting-out several confounding factors). On one hand, municipalities with increasingly larger shares 
of low-income students tend to also be municipalities where low-income students are more evenly distributed across 
schools. On the other hand, there is a mild positive association between academic and economic segregation, at both 
between and within-school levels (extending the same pattern found at the country level in OECD, 2019). Although 
far from unity, this positive correlation can be viewed as potentially regressive because it means low-income and 
low-achieving pupils are more likely exposed to negative peer effects from others like them, whereas wealthier and 
high-achieving ones are more likely exposed to positive peer influences from others alike. 
Our segregation estimates for the comparable segregation dimensions and populations of students are 20 to 35 
p.p. lower than what had earlier been estimated by Bêa (2018), indicating that student segregation in Portugal, though 
non-null and persistent, is not as intense as thought until now. In line with this, our estimates place median student 
between-school economic segregation in Portugal on the lower end of what has been estimated across inner London 
local authorities (Allen et al., 2015; same segregation index), and below that of countries such as Brazil (Bartholo, 
2013) and possibly Spain (Murillo & Martínez-Garrido, 2018). However, these two latter comparisons must be 
interpreted cautiously as they stem from different segregation metrics. Taking the insights of the NYC case of Conger 
(2005), our estimates of immigrant segregation (15% for both between and within-school cases) may be lower bounds 
to true racial/ethnic student segregation in Portugal. As in Conger (2005) we also conclude that between and within-
school immigrant segregation levels have equal magnitudes. 
It would be interesting to expand the current segregation analysis to other minority student populations not 
considered here – namely, taking into account private schools’ students and pupils enrolled in different tracks (e.g. 
vocational/professional tracks). One may also look at other students’ characteristics such as race/ethnicity (if made 
available in the future), or specialize those presented here (e.g. to look at the distribution of students with specific 
places of origin such as Brazil, Africa, and Eastern Europe). We leave these for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 We emphasize that we do not conclude the observed segregation patterns per se have benefited or hampered students’ in any 
particular way. We do conclude, however, that some segregation patterns exist (and have been stable over time), and given the 
accumulated evidence on broad peer effects discussed in Section 2, they may very well impact students in some fashion. Within-
school segregation patterns, in particular, should be of special concern, especially those driven by local agents’ behaviors (as in 
this case). Specifically, whenever particular interests (e.g. preferences toward certain classes’ compositions from teachers or 
parents with greater bargaining power within the school) may not align with those of the whole local community of students. 
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Appendix A 
Map A1 – Administrative division of continental Portugal. 
 
 
 
List of Districts (Region): 
 
1   –  Viana do Castelo (North) 
2   –  Braga (North) 
3   –  Porto (Porto) 
4   –  Aveiro (North) 
5   –  Coimbra (Alentejo & Center) 
6   –  Leiria (Alentejo & Center) 
7   –  Lisboa (Lisboa+) 
8   –  Setúbal (Lisboa+) 
9   –  Faro (Algarve) 
10 –  Beja (Alentejo & Center) 
11 –  Évora (Alentejo & Center) 
12 –  Portalegre (Alentejo & Center) 
13 –  Santarém (Alentejo & Center) 
14 –  Castelo Branco (Alentejo & Center) 
15 –  Guarda (North) 
16 –  Viseu (North) 
17 –  Vila Real (North) 
18 –  Bragança (North) 
 
Notes: The larger administrative divisions are the districts (thick black borders), while the smaller are the municipalities (faint grey borders). 
Each district is composed of several municipalities (15 on average). We define five regions – North, Porto, Alentejo & Center, Lisboa+, and 
Algarve – encompassing contiguous districts in order to simplify the exposition of some results. 
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Table A2 – Proportions of students enrolled in regular academic track and public schools 
  2006/07 2016/17 
% students enrolled in 
regular academic track 
cycle 1 (grades 1-4) 
cycle 2 (grades 5-6) 
cycle 3 (grades 7-9) 
cycle 4 (grades 10-12) 
 
99,9 
98,9 
90,4 
66,8 
 
99,4 
95,8 
88,1 
53,0 
 
% students enrolled in 
public schools (among 
regular academic track 
students) 
cycle 1 (grades 1-4) 
cycle 2 (grades 5-6) 
cycle 3 (grades 7-9) 
cycle 4 (grades 10-12) 
 
89,5 
87,7 
88,0 
88,9 
 
87,3 
86,5 
87,0 
86,0 
 
Notes: figures derived by authors based on official statistics from Estatísticas da Educação 06/07 (DGEEC) and Estatísticas da Educação 
2016/2017 (DGEEC). The universe is the set of students enrolled in continental Portugal schools. 
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o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 S
h
ar
e
 
S
eg
re
g
at
io
n
 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 S
h
ar
e
 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
L
o
w
 I
n
co
m
e 
1
 R
et
en
ti
o
n
 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
L
o
w
 I
n
co
m
e 
1
 R
et
en
ti
o
n
 
Municipality 
Segregation 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
 
1
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
 
0
.2
1
*
 
1
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
Population Share 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
L
o
w
 I
n
co
m
e 
 
-0
.2
8
*
 
0
.0
2
*
 
 
1
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
1
 R
et
en
ti
o
n
 
 
0
.0
4
*
 
0
.0
0
 
 
0
.1
2
*
 
1
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
School 
Segregation 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
 
0
.0
1
*
 
-0
.0
1
 
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
1
 
 
1
 
  
 
 
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
1
 
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
2
*
 
 
0
.2
0
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
Population Share 
Im
m
ig
. 
B
ac
k
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
L
o
w
 I
n
co
m
e 
 
0
.1
7
*
 
-0
.0
1
 
 
0
.3
9
*
 
-0
.0
5
*
 
 
-0
.0
6
*
 
0
.0
1
 
 
1
 
 
1
 R
et
en
ti
o
n
 
 
-0
.0
2
*
 
0
.0
7
*
 
 
-0
.0
8
*
 
0
.3
1
*
 
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
7
*
 
 
0
.3
2
*
 
1
 
N
o
te
s:
 T
h
is
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 m
at
ri
x
 i
s 
th
e 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
a 
tw
o
-s
ta
g
e 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
. 
In
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
st
ag
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
sc
h
o
o
l)
, 
sc
h
o
o
l-
y
ea
r,
 a
n
d
 g
ra
d
e 
fi
x
ed
 e
ff
e
ct
s 
w
er
e 
p
ar
ti
al
le
d
-o
u
t 
fr
o
m
 e
ac
h
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
sc
h
o
o
l)
 l
ev
el
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 p
re
se
n
t 
in
 t
h
e 
m
at
ri
x
. 
In
 t
h
e 
se
co
n
d
 s
ta
g
e 
a 
p
ar
ti
al
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 m
at
ri
x
 w
as
 c
o
m
p
u
te
d
 u
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
re
si
d
u
al
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
st
ag
e.
 T
h
is
 w
ay
, 
th
e 
p
ar
ti
al
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
sh
o
w
n
 h
er
e 
re
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
le
v
el
 o
f 
(l
in
ea
r)
 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 a
n
y
 p
ai
r 
o
f 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
b
ey
o
n
d
 t
h
e 
co
n
fo
u
n
d
in
g
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
sc
h
o
o
l)
, 
sc
h
o
o
l-
y
ea
r,
 a
n
d
 g
ra
d
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
it
ie
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
, 
h
o
ld
in
g
 f
ix
ed
 a
ll
 t
h
e 
o
th
er
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
p
re
se
n
t 
in
 t
h
e 
m
at
ri
x
. 
P
ar
ti
al
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
g
re
at
er
 t
h
an
 o
r 
eq
u
al
 t
o
 0
.2
 (
in
 a
b
so
lu
te
 v
al
u
e)
 a
re
 b
o
ld
 e
m
p
h
as
iz
ed
, 
an
d
 t
h
o
se
 w
it
h
 *
 a
re
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
ly
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
at
 5
%
 l
ev
el
. 
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o
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h
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es
 O
v
er
 T
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N
o
te
s:
 E
ac
h
 b
la
ck
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
a 
g
iv
en
 m
in
o
ri
ty
. 
T
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 i
s 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 
th
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
“U
n
it
” 
is
 e
it
h
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
fi
rs
t 
ro
w
 p
lo
ts
),
 o
r 
sc
h
o
o
l 
(s
ec
o
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 E
ac
h
 g
re
y
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
p
o
o
l 
o
f 
u
n
it
-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
, 
h
en
ce
 c
o
n
st
an
t 
ac
ro
ss
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
A
ll
 m
ed
ia
n
s’
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
 *
A
s 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
te
x
t,
 f
o
r 
w
it
h
in
-
sc
h
o
o
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
e 
o
n
ly
 c
o
n
si
d
er
 t
h
e 
sc
h
o
o
l-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
w
h
o
se
 g
ra
d
e 
is
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
 (
i.
e.
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
),
 s
o
 o
n
ly
 t
h
o
se
 c
as
es
 a
re
 p
o
o
le
d
 e
it
h
er
 o
v
er
al
l 
o
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 (
se
co
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 T
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
p
lo
t 
o
f 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 (
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
1
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
) 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
m
ed
ia
n
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 c
as
es
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
. 
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N
o
te
s:
 E
ac
h
 b
la
ck
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
a 
g
iv
en
 m
in
o
ri
ty
. 
T
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 i
s 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 
th
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
“U
n
it
” 
is
 e
it
h
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
fi
rs
t 
ro
w
 p
lo
ts
),
 o
r 
sc
h
o
o
l 
(s
ec
o
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 E
ac
h
 g
re
y
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
p
o
o
l 
o
f 
u
n
it
-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
, 
h
en
ce
 c
o
n
st
an
t 
ac
ro
ss
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
A
ll
 m
ed
ia
n
s’
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
 *
A
s 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
te
x
t,
 f
o
r 
w
it
h
in
-
sc
h
o
o
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
e 
o
n
ly
 c
o
n
si
d
er
 t
h
e 
sc
h
o
o
l-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
w
h
o
se
 g
ra
d
e 
is
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
 (
i.
e.
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
),
 s
o
 o
n
ly
 t
h
o
se
 c
as
es
 a
re
 p
o
o
le
d
 e
it
h
er
 o
v
er
al
l 
o
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 (
se
co
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 T
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
p
lo
t 
o
f 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 (
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
1
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
) 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
m
ed
ia
n
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 c
as
es
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
. 
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N
o
te
s:
 E
ac
h
 b
la
ck
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
a 
g
iv
en
 m
in
o
ri
ty
. 
T
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 i
s 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 
th
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
“U
n
it
” 
is
 e
it
h
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
fi
rs
t 
ro
w
 p
lo
ts
),
 o
r 
sc
h
o
o
l 
(s
ec
o
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
*
*
 E
ac
h
 g
re
y
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
p
o
o
l 
o
f 
u
n
it
-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
, 
h
en
ce
 c
o
n
st
an
t 
ac
ro
ss
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
A
ll
 m
ed
ia
n
s’
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
 
*
A
s 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
te
x
t,
 f
o
r 
w
it
h
in
-s
ch
o
o
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
e 
o
n
ly
 c
o
n
si
d
er
 t
h
e 
sc
h
o
o
l-
g
ra
d
e
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
w
h
o
se
 g
ra
d
e 
is
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
 (
i.
e.
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
),
 s
o
 o
n
ly
 t
h
o
se
 c
as
es
 
ar
e 
p
o
o
le
d
 e
it
h
er
 o
v
er
al
l 
o
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 (
se
co
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 T
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
p
lo
t 
o
f 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 (
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
1
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
) 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
m
ed
ia
n
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 c
as
es
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
. 
 
*
*
 D
is
tr
ic
ts
 o
n
ly
 w
o
rk
 a
s 
a 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 t
o
 p
o
o
l 
th
e 
u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 c
as
es
 f
o
r 
w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
“u
n
it
” 
(e
it
h
er
 a
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 o
r 
a 
sc
h
o
o
l)
 h
ap
p
en
s 
to
 b
el
o
n
g
 t
o
 a
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
d
is
tr
ic
t.
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N
o
te
s:
 E
ac
h
 b
la
ck
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
a 
g
iv
en
 m
in
o
ri
ty
. 
T
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 i
s 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 
th
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
“U
n
it
” 
is
 e
it
h
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
fi
rs
t 
ro
w
 p
lo
ts
),
 o
r 
sc
h
o
o
l 
(s
ec
o
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 E
ac
h
 g
re
y
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
p
o
o
l 
o
f 
u
n
it
-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
, 
h
en
ce
 c
o
n
st
an
t 
ac
ro
ss
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
A
ll
 m
ed
ia
n
s’
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
 C
y
cl
es
 g
ro
u
p
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
th
at
 
b
el
o
n
g
 t
o
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 g
ra
d
es
: 
1
st
 c
y
cl
e 
(p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
) 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
; 
2
n
d
 c
y
cl
e 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 5
 a
n
d
 6
; 
3
rd
 c
y
cl
e 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 7
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 9
; 
4
th
 c
y
cl
e 
(u
p
p
er
-s
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
) 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 1
0
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 1
2
. 
*
A
s 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
te
x
t,
 f
o
r 
w
it
h
in
-s
ch
o
o
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
e 
o
n
ly
 c
o
n
si
d
er
 t
h
e 
sc
h
o
o
l-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
w
h
o
se
 g
ra
d
e 
is
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
 (
i.
e.
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
),
 s
o
 o
n
ly
 t
h
o
se
 
ca
se
s 
ar
e 
p
o
o
le
d
 e
it
h
er
 o
v
er
al
l 
o
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 (
se
co
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 T
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
p
lo
t 
o
f 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 (
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
1
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
) 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
m
ed
ia
n
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 c
as
es
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
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o
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 S
h
ar
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cr
o
ss
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eg
io
n
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O
v
er
 T
im
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N
o
te
s:
 E
ac
h
 b
la
ck
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
a 
g
iv
en
 m
in
o
ri
ty
. 
T
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 i
s 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 
th
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
“U
n
it
” 
is
 e
it
h
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 (
fi
rs
t 
ro
w
 p
lo
ts
),
 o
r 
sc
h
o
o
l 
(s
ec
o
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
*
*
 E
ac
h
 g
re
y
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 s
h
ar
e 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
al
l 
p
o
o
l 
o
f 
u
n
it
-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
, 
h
en
ce
 c
o
n
st
an
t 
ac
ro
ss
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
A
ll
 m
ed
ia
n
s’
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
  
*
A
s 
ex
p
la
in
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
te
x
t,
 f
o
r 
w
it
h
in
-s
ch
o
o
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
e 
o
n
ly
 c
o
n
si
d
er
 t
h
e 
sc
h
o
o
l-
g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
w
h
o
se
 g
ra
d
e 
is
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
 (
i.
e.
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
),
 s
o
 o
n
ly
 t
h
o
se
 c
as
es
 
ar
e 
p
o
o
le
d
 e
it
h
er
 o
v
er
al
l 
o
r 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 (
se
co
n
d
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
).
 T
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
p
lo
t 
o
f 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
in
o
ri
ty
 (
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
1
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
) 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
m
ed
ia
n
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 c
as
es
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
.  
*
*
R
eg
io
n
s 
o
n
ly
 w
o
rk
 a
s 
a 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 t
o
 p
o
o
l 
th
e 
u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
fo
r 
w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
“u
n
it
” 
(e
it
h
er
 a
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 o
r 
a 
sc
h
o
o
l)
 h
ap
p
en
s 
to
 b
el
o
n
g
 t
o
 a
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
re
g
io
n
. 
In
 t
u
rn
, 
“r
eg
io
n
s”
 g
ro
u
p
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
: 
“p
o
rt
o
” 
–
 P
o
rt
o
; 
“l
is
b
o
a+
” 
–
 L
is
b
o
a 
an
d
 S
et
ú
b
al
; 
“a
lg
ar
v
e”
 –
 F
ar
o
; 
“a
le
n
te
jo
 &
 c
en
te
r”
 –
 B
ej
a,
 É
v
o
ra
, 
P
o
rt
al
eg
re
, 
S
an
ta
ré
m
, 
L
ei
ri
a,
 C
o
im
b
ra
, 
an
d
 C
as
te
lo
 B
ra
n
co
; 
“n
o
rt
h
” 
–
 V
ia
n
a 
d
o
 C
as
te
lo
, 
B
ra
g
a,
 V
il
a 
R
ea
l,
 
B
ra
g
an
ça
, 
G
u
ar
d
a,
 V
is
eu
, 
an
d
 A
v
ei
ro
. 
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M
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o
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d
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n
d
 I
n
d
ex
 I
n
fl
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io
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
te
s:
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
in
o
ri
ty
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 a
re
 a
t 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 a
n
d
 s
ch
o
o
l 
le
v
el
s,
 f
o
r 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
in
-s
ch
o
o
l 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
s 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
E
ac
h
 s
ca
tt
er
p
lo
t 
p
lo
ts
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
 a
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
cl
as
si
c 
in
d
ex
 (
D
) 
an
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
d
en
si
ty
 c
o
rr
ec
te
d
 i
n
d
ex
 (
D
d
c)
, 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
is
 t
ak
en
 f
o
r 
al
l 
ca
se
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
th
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 (
S
ta
ta
 c
o
m
m
an
d
: 
b
in
sc
at
te
r,
 s
ee
 S
te
p
n
er
, 
2
0
1
3
).
 T
h
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 w
as
 t
ri
m
m
ed
 a
t 
1
0
0
 f
o
r 
ea
se
 o
f 
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 e
x
p
o
si
ti
o
n
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N
o
te
s:
 t
h
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
m
in
o
ri
ty
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 a
re
 a
t 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 a
n
d
 s
ch
o
o
l 
le
v
el
s,
 f
o
r 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
in
-s
ch
o
o
l 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
s 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
E
ac
h
 s
ca
tt
er
p
lo
t 
p
lo
ts
 t
h
e 
av
e
ra
g
e 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
 a
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 
b
y
 t
h
e 
cl
as
si
c 
in
d
ex
 (
D
) 
an
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
d
en
si
ty
 c
o
rr
ec
te
d
 i
n
d
ex
 (
D
d
c)
, 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
is
 t
ak
en
 f
o
r 
al
l 
ca
se
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
th
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 (
S
ta
ta
 c
o
m
m
an
d
: 
b
in
sc
at
te
r,
 s
ee
 S
te
p
n
er
, 
2
0
1
3
).
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N
o
te
s:
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h
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ag
e 
u
n
it
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iz
es
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ef
er
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o
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ch
o
o
ls
 a
t 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
 l
ev
el
 a
n
d
 t
o
 c
la
ss
es
 a
t 
th
e 
sc
h
o
o
l 
le
v
el
, 
fo
r 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
in
-s
ch
o
o
l 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
s 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
E
ac
h
 s
ca
tt
er
p
lo
t 
p
lo
ts
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
 a
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
cl
as
si
c 
in
d
ex
 (
D
) 
an
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
d
en
si
ty
 c
o
rr
ec
te
d
 i
n
d
ex
 (
D
d
c)
, 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
is
 t
ak
en
 f
o
r 
al
l 
ca
se
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
th
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 (
S
ta
ta
 c
o
m
m
an
d
: 
b
in
sc
at
te
r,
 
se
e 
S
te
p
n
er
, 
2
0
1
3
).
 T
h
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
, 
o
n
 f
ir
st
 r
o
w
 p
lo
ts
, 
w
as
 t
ri
m
m
ed
 a
t 
1
5
0
 f
o
r 
ea
se
 o
f 
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 e
x
p
o
si
ti
o
n
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F
ig
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 A
9
 –
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
S
ch
o
o
ls
 f
o
r 
E
ac
h
 S
am
p
le
 o
f 
W
el
l-
D
ef
in
ed
 C
as
es
 (
W
D
C
) 
o
f 
S
eg
re
g
at
io
n
 (
ac
ro
ss
 g
ra
d
es
 a
n
d
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
te
s:
 E
ac
h
 b
la
ck
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
ls
. 
T
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 i
s 
ta
k
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 
th
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
E
ac
h
 g
re
y
 d
o
t 
re
p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
m
ed
ia
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
ls
 t
ak
en
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
o
v
er
a
ll
 p
o
o
l 
o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
, 
h
en
ce
 
co
n
st
an
t 
ac
ro
ss
 h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
A
ll
 m
ed
ia
n
s’
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
 
*
 T
h
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
p
lo
t 
o
f 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
ls
 f
o
r 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ac
ad
em
ic
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
m
ed
ia
n
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 c
as
es
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
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O
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5
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5
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d
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5
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 P
er
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n
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N
o
te
s:
 A
ll
 s
er
ie
s 
re
p
re
se
n
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 o
f 
se
g
re
g
at
io
n
 a
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
d
en
si
ty
 c
o
rr
ec
te
d
 d
is
si
m
il
ar
it
y
 i
n
d
ex
 (
D
d
c)
. 
P
2
5
, 
P
5
0
, 
an
d
 P
7
5
 (
co
n
n
ec
te
d
 l
in
es
) 
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
 t
o
 p
er
ce
n
ti
le
s 
2
5
, 
5
0
 (
m
ed
ia
n
),
 a
n
d
 7
5
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
, 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 p
o
o
li
n
g
 a
ll
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
 (
i)
 a
re
 c
as
es
 o
f 
w
el
l-
d
ef
in
ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 t
h
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
. 
A
ll
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
s.
 C
y
cl
es
 g
ro
u
p
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
th
at
 b
el
o
n
g
 t
o
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 g
ra
d
es
: 
1
st
 c
y
cl
e 
(p
ri
m
ar
y
 s
ch
o
o
li
n
g
) 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 1
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 4
; 
2
n
d
 c
y
cl
e 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 5
 a
n
d
 6
; 
3
rd
 c
y
cl
e 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 7
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 9
; 
4
th
 c
y
cl
e 
(u
p
p
er
-s
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
) 
–
 g
ra
d
es
 1
0
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 1
2
. 
 
*
 T
h
e 
p
lo
ts
 o
f 
b
et
w
ee
n
-s
ch
o
o
l 
ac
ad
em
ic
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
 d
o
 n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
-1
-y
ea
r 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
at
 i
s 
1
st
 g
ra
d
e 
ca
se
s,
 a
s 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 r
et
en
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
is
 g
ra
d
e 
(t
h
u
s 
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
s 
st
em
 f
ro
m
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
p
o
o
li
n
g
 
al
l 
ca
se
s 
ex
ce
p
t 
th
es
e)
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 l
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rr
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 p
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g
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ll
 s
ch
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y
ea
rs
 t
h
at
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i)
 a
re
 c
as
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 o
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w
el
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d
ef
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ed
 s
eg
re
g
at
io
n
*
, 
an
d
 t
h
at
 (
ii
) 
sh
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
ax
is
 c
at
eg
o
ry
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A
ll
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 h
av
e 
9
5
%
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n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
te
rv
al
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 C
y
cl
es
 g
ro
u
p
 u
n
it
-g
ra
d
e-
y
ea
r 
ca
se
s 
th
at
 b
el
o
n
g
 t
o
 s
p
ec
if
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Appendix B – Segregation Estimates by District 
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Regional differences are more pronounced in terms of between-school segregation rather than within. Figure B1 
depicts the six segregation-districts profiles where districts work only as a reference to pool the unit-grade-year cases 
for which the “unit” (either a municipality or a school) happens to belong to. Lisboa and Setúbal districts show the 
highest levels of median between-school segregation across all three dimensions, around 17% to 21%. Porto district 
attains between-school segregation levels that are above the overall median with respect to economic and immigrant 
segregation (just as Lisboa and Setúbal), but not with respect to academic segregation. The lowest levels of median 
between-school economic segregation are found in northern and central districts such as Viana do Castelo, Braga, 
Aveiro, Santarém, and Viseu (around 12-13%).29 
In turn, schools that are closer to having the fair shares of the municipality immigrant students are mainly found 
in northern districts: Viana do Castelo, Leiria (center, not northern), Évora (even considering its wide confidence 
interval; south-center, not northern), Guarda, Viseu, Vila Real, and Bragança. Notice that as mentioned in Section 5, 
these districts tend to house immigrant students born in countries that are usually targets of Portuguese emigration 
and whose parents (or at least one of them) were actually born in Portugal. It is, in fact, in the districts that tend to 
house relatively more immigrants whose origin is either from Brazil, Africa (Portuguese-speaking countries), or 
Eastern Europe, that between-school segregation is higher: Lisboa, Porto, and Setúbal. Faro district (which has a 
considerable share of municipality-grade-years considered to be well-defined cases of immigrant segregation, almost 
as high as the districts of Lisboa and Setúbal, see Table A5, as well as the largest median share of immigrants across 
its municipality-grade-years, almost 25%, see top right graph of Figure A3) is the exception according to Figure B1 
(top right graph), as its immigrant students tend to also be of the latter type and yet they are less segregated across 
schools there than their counterparts of Lisboa, Porto, and Setúbal.30 
Finally, the interquartile ranges of all series presented in Figure B1 also revolve around 15 p.p., but again that 
of within-school academic segregation is the largest (20 p.p.). 
The general findings relative to between-school segregation confirm and expand those obtained in Justino et al. 
(2017) and Baptista & Pereira (2018), namely that the levels of economic and (as now advanced here) of academic 
and immigrant between-school segregation tend to be greater in districts whose municipality-grade-years show a 
higher density of schools (comparing the top and bottom rows of Figures B1 and A9, respectively). Faro seems the 
only exception to this relationship, as it has a fair amount of schools, but lower levels of between-school segregation 
(across all three dimensions). 
Figures B2 and B3 present the regional differences over time. The main insights discussed above seem to endure: 
higher median between-school segregation in the Lisboa-Setúbal region (Lisboa+) and almost no regional differences 
in terms of within-school segregation. Only two main new points: first, the series break of between-school economic 
segregation was felt more intensely for students living in municipalities located in the regions of Lisboa+ and Porto; 
second, the between-school immigrant segregation peak of Porto shown in Figure B1 (top right) seems to be 
 
29 Although low-income students seem to be almost equally distributed across schools within municipalities located in northern 
districts, it is in the schools of northern-most districts of Guarda, Vila Real, and Bragança that these students are more segregated 
within-schools, across classes. There, the corresponding median density-corrected index attains levels around 19-21%, which 
are slightly, but significantly, above the overall median of 17%. 
30 Note that Faro district has an immigrant share larger than that of Setúbal (Figure A3), and the same median number of schools 
as Setúbal (Figure A9). Still, Faro’s between-school immigrant segregation levels are visibly lower than those of Setúbal. This 
points to regional differences in between-school immigrant segregation patterns beyond those that can be related to differences 
in minority share and school network granularity. 
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somewhat driven by higher median segregation levels during the first half of the period analyzed (the confidence 
interval is quite large though, as just a very small portion of Porto’s municipality-grade-years correspond to cases of 
well-defined between-school immigrant segregation, see Table A5). 
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